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I. INTRODUCTION
Other companies don't like to give damaging information on prior
employees. For years, they would never give anything at all except
the dates of employment. But now there's something called com-
pelled self-publication .... I
Defamation claims are on the rise in the workplace. Approxi-
mately one-third of all defamation claims originate in the workplace.
2
Such claims are costly, as juries award generous verdicts,3 and, win or
1 MICHAEL CRICHTON, DISCLOSURE 269 (1994). However, the author does not
endorse the view of sexual harassment set forth in Dr. Crichton's novel. For a critique
of DISCLOSURE, see Maria L. Ontiveros, Fictionalizing Harassment/Disclosing the Truth, 93
MICH. L. REv. 1373 (1995).
2 John Bruce Lewis et al., Defamation and the Workplace: A Survey of the Law and
Proposals for Reform, 54 Mo. L. REV. 797, 798 (1989); Gregory Stricharchuk, Fired Em-
ployees Turn the Reason for Dismissal into a Legal Weapon, WALL ST.J., Oct. 2, 1986, at 33.
3 See Roger B. Jacobs, Defamation and Negligence in the Workplace, LAB. L.J., Sept.
1989, at 571 (observing that between 1980 and 1989 there were forty workplace defa-
mation awards exceeding $1 million); Lewis et al., supra, note 2, at 798 (noting that
"[v] erdicts of more than $1 million in these cases are ndt unusual and some verdicts
have reached as high as $6 million"); Stricharchuk, supra, note 2, at 33 ($112,000 as
the average amount of damages in cases where the former employee has received a
favorable jury verdict). But seeJAMES N. DERTOUZOS ET AL., THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES OF WRONGFUL TERMINATION 46 (THE RAND CORP. 1988) ("Despite the
tremendous publicity given bigjury awards, popular accounts of potential payouts are
very misleading. After post-trial reductions and subtraction of contingency fees, most
plaintiffs receive net amounts that are lower than a six-month severance payment.");
Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L. Willborn, Employer (Ir)rationality and the Demise of Em-
ployment References, 30 AM. Bus. L.J. 123, 140-41 (1992) (arguing that while large jury
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lose, employers face high defense costs. 4
A variety of workplace situations can spawn defamation liability.5
The problems of workplace defamation claims are well-documented
by the popular and business press, as well by legal commentators. 6 In
awards tend to receive media and employer attention, employers are unaware of the
final outcome of cases after appeal, remittitur or new trial, where jury awards are
reduced, and cases which result in smaller awards or no award for plaintiffs "may be
forgotten or discounted"). However, as one commentator has noted, an average jury
award of $112,000 "is hardly an insignificant amount." Arlen W. Langvardt, Defama-
tion in the Business Setting: Basics and Practical Perspectives, Bus. HORIZONS, Sept.-Oct.
1990, at 66, 71.
4 William L. Kandel, Workplace Honesty and Security: Precautions About Prevention,
16 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 79, 85 (1990) ("The risk of defamation claims is real and the
cost of defending, regardless of outcome, is substantial."); Deanna J. Mouser, Self-
Publication Defamation and the Employment Relationship, 13 INDUS. REL. L.J. 241, 275-76 &
n.203 (1991/1992) (concluding that even if the employer prevails, the employer
spends substantial amounts of money and time conducting discovery and otherwise
defending against a defamation suit); Stricharchuk, supra note 2, at 33 ("Defending
[defamation] actions can take years and cost employers tens of thousands of dol-
lars."); Jo Ann Tooley et al., Scaring Bosses into Silence, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Oct.
16, 1989, at 125 ("Defending a defamation suit before a jury can cost as much as
$250,000, even if the company prevails."). But see Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L.
Willborn, supra note 3, at 134-40. Ms. Paetzold and Professor Willborn assert that
defense costs for workplace defamation actions actually have decreased during the
period 1970-1990. They cite two reasons for the decreased costs. First, they argue
that as a result of growing use of summary disposition, only 55% of claims survive
summary judgment, and such cases are litigated for far less than cases which must be
resolved on the merits. Second, they note that, in contrast to earlier years, workplace
defamation claims in the 1990's are more likely to be combined with other wrongful
discharge or additional employment-related causes of action. Thus, Ms. Paetzold and
Prof. Willborn conclude, "to the extent litigation expenses would be incurred by em-
ployers on wrongful discharge claims even in the absence of a defamation claim, the
marginal cost of defending the defamation claim is greatly reduced." Id at 140. The
authors of a study by the RAND Corporation voice a similar view regarding wrongful
termination claims in general: "If the average verdict results in a payment of
$208,000, the sample mean after post-trial reductions, the annual cost of jury trials,
including legal fees, amounts to only $2.56 per worker .... [S] ettlement costs, when
added to the expense ofjury trials, add to only $12.25 per worker." DERTOUZOS, supra
note 3, at 47-48 (footnotes omitted). In any event, counsel generally view defamation
cases from a pragmatic perspective. In the words of one management lawyer, "No-
body wants to have to defend against one of these cases .... Even if the law is on your
side, you can't really win. The best you can do is not lose. No matter how a case
comes out, you still have all the bad publicity and the big legal fees." Tamar Lewin,
Boss Can Be Sued for Saying Too Much, N.Y. TnmEs, Nov. 27, 1987, at B26 (quoting Peter
Panken, a New York lawyer who represents employers).
5 See infra text accompanying notes 28-38.
6 Numerous commentators in both the academic and popular press have ana-
lyzed the impact of workplace defamation claims generally on the employment rela-
tionship. See generally RichardJ. Larson, Defamation at the Workplace: Employers Beware, 5
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particular, the pitfalls of providing defamatory references have re-
ceived substantial attention.7 While the issue of references has occu-
pied center stage in the discourse on workplace defamation claims, a
less publicized but equally potent trend in expanding defamation lia-
bility lies in the background. In some jurisdictions, an employee may
HOFSTRA LAB. LJ. 45 (1987); Lewis et al., supra note 2; David C. Martin & Kathryn M.
Bartol, Potential Libel and Slander Issues Involving Discharged Employees, 13 EMPLOYEE REL.
LJ. 43 (1987); Robbin T. Sarrazin, Defamation in the Employment Setting, 29 TENN. B.J.
18 (1993); David Yulish & Brian Heshizer, Defamation in the Workplace, 40 LAB. LJ. 355
(1989); Ann M. Barry, Note, Defamation in the Workplace: the Impact of IncreasingEmployer
Liability, 72 MARQ. L. REv. 264 (1989); Laurence Shore, Comment, Defamation and
Employment Relationships: The New Meanings of Private Speech, Publication, and Privilege, 38
EMORY LJ. 871 (1989); David Grant, Giving a Reference: Just Name, Rank and Salary
History ?, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 30, 1987, at 16 ("The increase in employment-related def-
amation actions is the single most important reason why many employers now only
grudgingly disclose information about former employees."); Stephen M. Koslow,
When Discharging Employees, the Less Said the Better, Ideas & Trends (CCH) 100 (June 8,
1994); Langvardt, supra note 3; Tamar Lewin, Boss Can Be Sued for Saying Too Much,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1987, at 26 (noting trend of employment defamation cases and
employer concern about defamation liability); Martha Middleton, Employers Face Up-
surge in Suits over Defamation, NAT'L LJ., May 4, 1987, at 1. 30 (discussing employer
response to the developing "compelled defamation" claim); Gabriella Stern, Compa-
nies Discover that Some Firings Backfire into Costly Defamation Suits, WALL ST. J., May 5,
1993, at BI; Stricharchuk, supra note 2, at 33.
7 Employers who give defamatory references to prospective employers may be
liable for defamation. Numerous commentators have written about defamation
claims based on references. See, e.g., James W. Fenton, Jr. & Kay W. Lawrimore, Em-
ployment Reference Checking, Firm Size, and Defamation Liability, J. OF SMALL Bus. MGMT,
Oct. 1992, at 88; Paetzold & Willbom, supra note 3, at 123; Deborah Daniloff, Note,
Employer Defamation: Reasons and Remedies for Declining References and Chilled Communica-
tions in the Workplace, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 687 (1989); Edward R. Horkan, Note, Con-
tracting Around the Law of Defamation and Employment References, 79 VA. L. REV. 517
(1993);Jeff B. Copeland etal., The Revenge of the Fired, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 16, 1987, at 46;
Grant, supra note 6,at 16; Deborah S. Kleiner, Is Silence Truly Golden? Employment Refer-
ences; Professional Speaking, H.R. MAG., July 1993, at 111; Terri Lammers, By The Num-
bers, INC., June 1989, at 137; Karen Matthes, Staying Neutral Doesn't Mean You're
Protected; Employment References; Employee Reference, H.R. Focus, Apr. 1993, at 3; Tooley,
supra note 4, at 125 ("Nearly a third of all libel cases come from workers who sue
former employers over bad references."); Workers Refused Jobs Due to Bad References Win-
ning Suits Against Ex-Employers, Lawyer Says, 64 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-3 (Apr. 3,
1990). However, the trend toward neutral references may increase the likelihood that
problem employees are hired by unsuspecting employers. See David E. Rovella, Laws
May Ease the Risky Business ofJob References, NAT'L LJ., Oct. 23, 1995, at B1. With regard
to references, some states have enacted or proposed laws to shield employers from
defamation claims based on references. Id. at B2; see also Negligence, Defamation Claim
Dangers Are Assessed at BNA IER Conference, 213 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-3 (Nov. 5,
1987) (discussing "negligent references" as an emerging tort theory linked to neutral
reference policies).
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sue an employer for defamation based on statements made by the em-
ployer to the employee, outside the hearing of others, which the em-
ployee subsequently repeats in a job interview with a prospective
employer. This is the doctrine of "compelled self-publication." 8 Rec-
ognized in a growing minority ofjurisdictions, the compelled self-pub-
lication doctrine also is emerging as a subject of concern in the
popular and business press as well as among legal commentators. 9
8 Courts have recognized two versions of defamation based on self-publication.
Most courts require that the employer knew or could have foreseen that the employee
would be compelled to repeat the allegedly defamatory statement. See, e.g., McKinney
v. County of Santa Clara, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1980); Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co. 759
P.2d 1336 (Colo. 1988); Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 389
N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986). In contrast, a few courts merely require foreseeability of
publication by the plaintiff and do not emphasize compelled disclosure. In those
jurisdictions, it is sufficient that the employer knew or should have known that the
plaintiff would be likely to repeat the statement. E.g., Grist v. Upjohn Co., 168
N.W.2d 389 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969); Neighbors v. Kirksville College of Osteopathic
Med., 694 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); see infra discussion Part II.C. Unless other-
wise indicated, use of the terms "self-publication" and "compelled self-publication" in
this Article encompasses both approaches to workplace defamation claims.
9 See, e.g., Louis B. Eble, Self-Publication Defamation: Employee Right or Employee Bur-
den , 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 745 (1995); Arlen W. Langvardt, Defamation in the Employment
Discharge Context: The Emerging Doctrine of Compelled Self-Publication, 26 DuQ. L. REv. 227
(1987); Mouser, supra note 4, at 241; Robert A. Shearer, The Self-Publication Doctrine:
Expanding Employer Defamation Liability, 16 EMPLOYEE RFL. L.J., 55 (1990), at 55; How-
ard J. Siegel, Self-Publication: Defamation Within the Employment Context, 26 ST. MARY'S
LJ. 1 (1994); Ronald Turner, Compelled Self-Publication: How Discharge Begets Defamation,
14 EMPLOYEE REL. LJ. 19 (1988); S. Olivia Mastry, Comment, Speak No Evil: The Minne-
sota Supreme Court Adopts Self-Publication Defamation: Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y of the U.S., 71 MINN. L. REv. 1092 (1987); GeoffreyJ. Moul, Comment, Defama-
tion Publication Revisited: The Development of the Doctrine of Self-Publication, 54 OHIO ST.
LJ. 1183 (1993); Charles S. Murray, Jr., Note, Compelled Self-Publication in the Employ-
ment Context: A Consistent Exception to the Defamation Requirement of Publication, 45 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 295 (1988); Doug W. Ray, Note, A Unified Theory for Consent and Com-
pelled Self-Publication in Employee Defamation: Economic Duress in Tort Law, 67 TEX. L. REv.
1295 (1989); Laurence Shore, Comment, Defamation and Employment Relationships: The
New Meanings of Private Speech, Publication, and Privilege, 38 EMORY LJ. 871 (1989);
David P. Chapus, Annotation, Publication of Allegedly Defamatory Matter by Plaintiff ("Self-
Publication") as Sufficient to Support Defamation Action, 62 A.L.R. 4th 616 (1994); Nancy
Blodgett, New Twist to Defamation Suits: Company Held Liable for Self-Publication, A.B.A.J.,
May 1, 1987, at 17; Langvardt, supra note 3, at 66; RichardJ. Reibstein, Employee Defa-
mation: A New Theory, N.Y. LJ., Dec. 27, 1989, at 1; Daniel Roth, Be Wary of Compelled
Self-Publication Lawsuits Another Quirky Worry When Firing Employees, CORP. LEGAL TIMES,
Apr. 1994, at 26; Junda Woo, Quirky Slander Actions Threaten Employers, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 26, 1993, at BI (noting that courts in several states, including California, Texas,
Minnesota and parts of New York have recognized the doctrine of compelled self-
publication).
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This Article will examine the development of the compelled self-
publication doctrine and its application to the modem workplace.
Beginning with the rules applied generally to defamation claims, the
Article first will explore the general rule that self-publication is not
actionable. The Article will then trace the evolution of the workplace
exception to the general rule and analyze how courts have applied the
exception in employment cases. Examining the formative cases, the
Article will demonstrate how the doctrine developed primarily in
cases of unfair conduct by employers where, in the absence of a defa-
mation claim, the aggrieved employees would have had no remedy.
With its genesis in such cases-the "hard cases"-the existing doctrine
of self-publication defamation, if not "bad law,"10 certainly hinders
day-to-day workplace communications.
Recognition of defamation claims based on self-publication in-
hibits the flow of useful information in the workplace-information
needed by prospective employers, employees who engage in miscon-
duct or have performance problems, and co-workers of problem
employees. Current doctrine chills honest evaluation and communica-
tion about employee performance, as employers strive to protect
themselves from defamation claims by adopting policies of providing
only "name, rank and serial number" references." This kind of lim-
ited reference is of little use to an employer in assessing the skills,
performance and suitability of a prospective employee. 12 In addition,
this approach to references "allows bad employees to pass from em-
ployer to employer and punishes good employees who deserve the
benefit of a positive referral.' u3 The chilling effect is exacerbated
10 See Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d
876, 894 (Minn. 1986) (Kelley, J., dissenting) (quoting the maxim "hard cases make
bad law").
11 See Roth, supra note 9, at 26 ("Many counsel say a good defense is to use the
military metaphor of giving only name, rank and serial number-dates of employ-
ment, last position and, in some cases, last pay-when asked for a reference. By tell-
ing an employee that the company will only give out 'military' references, the
company covers its rear flank," says Eszra D. Singer, assistant general counsel-human
resources at GTE.).
12 As one commentator notes, "[t]aken to its extreme, the silence policy means
that the former employer does not reveal even the negative information that the for-
mer employer knows or has good reason to believe is true. The understandable fear
of the former employer is that despite the truth of the information, disclosing it
might prompt the filing of a defamation suit that would be costly even though success-
fully defended." Langvardt, supra note 3, at 73.
13 Richard C. Reuben, Employment Lawyers Rethink Advice, A.BA. J., June 1994, at
32; see also Negligence, Defamation Claim Dangers Are Assessed at BNA JER Conference, 213
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-3 (Nov. 5, 1987) (relating Washington, D.C. attorney Robert
Fitzpatrick's criticism of the use of "name, rank and serial number" references as be-
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when the defamation claim is based on self-publication, because self-
publication claims arise in situations where the employer has not com-
municated information to anyone other than the plaintiff employee.
14
Consequently, to avoid compelled self-publication claims, litigation-
wary employers are counseled to limit information given to their em-
ployees as well as to prospective employers. 15 A recent personnel
newsletter is typical of advice given to employers:
So what should you say when discharging an employee? "We have
decided that it's in the best interest of the company to let you go"-
will do just fine. There is no need to say more, even if the employee
asks for clarification. And ... it's wisest to avoid any explanation for
a discharge that you can't back up in court.
16
Because most employers would prefer to avoid having to "back up
[explanations] in court," the fear of litigation is a strong disincentive
to the free flow of candid information in the workplace.' 7 The com-
pelled self-publication doctrine fuels that fear, creating problems for
all parties in the workplace. First, employers are unable to obtain can-
did and useful information from references. Second, employees with
problems may not receive candid assessments which could help them
improve performance or avoid repetition of mistakes in future jobs.
ing unfair to good employees and employers who attempt to screen incompetent or
dangerous workers from their businesses).
14 See, e.g., William L. Kandel, Workplace Dishonesty and Security: Precautions About
Prevention, 16 EMPLOYEE REL. LJ. 79, 85 (1990) ("Employers that have terminated em-
ployees involuntarily face defamation risks even if they adhere to 'no comment' refer-
ence policies and even if the discharge was implemented on a face-to-face basis with
no breach of confidentiality. The doctrine of compelled self-defamation [sic], in-
creasingly accepted by the courts, creates this risk."); Robert A. Shearer, The Self-Publi-
cation Doctrine: Expanding Employer Defamation Liability, 16 EMPLOE REL. LJ. 57, 65
(1990) (admonishing employers to remember that "a private employer-employee con-
versation, later repeated by the employee, could be the basis of a defamation claim.").
15 See, e.g, Middleton, supra note 6, at 30 (Middleton quotes an admonition by
Chicago employment lawyer Michael J. Leech, who warns employers that defamation
claims provide "unlimited theoretical exposure.... Everytime you open your mouth
or write something down, you're opening yourself up to potential liability." The au-
thor adds, "[f]or that reason, lawyers increasingly are telling employers what to say-
or not to say-regarding everything from the handling of personnel files to requests
for job references.").
16 Koslow, supra note 6, at 100.
17 Employer reluctance to defend defamation may be based on the perceived
odds of success. According to one report, "a plaintiff has a 77% chance of winning a
libel or slander case against an employer or against a corporation with which the
plaintiff has had previous business dealings." Lammers, supra note 7, at 137. But see
Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 3, at 123-24 (arguing that employees seldom recover
in defamation actions against their employers).
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Finally, co-workers also suffer when problem employees work as their
colleagues. 18
Notwithstanding these problems, a self-publication defamation
claim may be the appropriate remedy in some circumstances. Thus,
rejecting the doctrine is not the best solution to the problems created
by the doctrine. Instead, modifying the existing doctrine is the best
accommodation of workplace and societal interests.
This Article proposes restructuring the elements of workplace
defamation claims based on compelled self-publication. 19 The pro-
posed standard would limit self-publication defamation claims to the
"hard cases"-cases of egregious employer conduct. To establish a
prima facie case, the self-publishing plaintiff would be required to al-
lege and prove that the employer defamed the plaintiff with a mislead-
ing or insupportable characterization of reasons for termination or,
alternatively, that the employer's defamatory explanation was moti-
vated by ill will toward the employee. In addition, to establish compul-
sion, the plaintiff would have to show that she repeated the statement
in response to a prospective employer's inquiry. Finally, the plaintiff
would have to prove she made a reasonable effort to rebut the false
statement.
Part II of the Article discusses the evolution of self-publication
defamation in the workplace, describing the general principles con-
cerning publication, tracing the development of the workplace excep-
tion, and outlining legislative and common law approaches to the
doctrine. Part III describes competing concerns underlying the doc-
trine, including a discussion of the benefits and costs inherent in rec-
ognizing the doctrine. Part III concludes by calling for an approach
of accommodation, balance and compromise. Part IV suggests a new
version of workplace self-publication defamation. The restructured
cause of action would lessen the likelihood of frivolous claims and
provide a remedy where facts support the need for a tort cause of
action, thereby accommodating the interests of employers, employees
and the public.
18 Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, Toward a Theory of "Just Cause" in Employ-
ment Discipline Cases, 1985 DuKI L.J. 594, 606 (1985) (noting that unsatisfactory em-
ployees make the jobs of their co-workers more difficult); see also DERTouzos, supra
note 3, at 1 (discussing the impact of the threat of litigation on hiring and firing
decisions and noting that when employers fear terminating inadequate performers,
the morale and performance of otherwise productive employees may suffer).
19 See discussion infra Part IV.
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SELF-PUBLICATION DOCTRINE IN THE
EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT
A. Publication as an Essential Element of Defamation and the
General Rule Prohibiting Claims Based on Self-Publication
In general, a defamatory statement is one which harms the plain-
tiff's reputation in a manner that lowers her esteem in the community
or deters people from associating with her.20 The two forms of defa-
mation are libel and slander. Generally, libel "consists in the publica-
tion of defamatory matters by (1) written or printed words, (2) its
embodiment in physical form, or (3) any other form of communica-
tion which has the potentially harmful qualities characteristic of writ-
ten or printed words."2' Slander generally refers to oral defamation.
22
The key significance of the libel-slander distinction relates to proof of
damages. Under the common law, a libel action does not require
proof of "special damages," that is, economic or pecuniary loss.
2 3
Slander, on the other hand, generally requires proof of special dam-
ages unless the statement imputes to the plaintiff criminal conduct, a
loathsome disease, serious sexual misconduct, or misconduct in the
plaintiffs business, trade, profession or office.
2 4
Under common law principles,25 the plaintiff in a defamation ac-
tion must establish the following:
20 E.g., Burns v. McGraw-Hill Broad. Co., 659 P.2d 1351, 1357 (Colo. 1983);
Thomas M. Merton Ctr. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 442 A.2d 213, 215 (Pa. 1981); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 774 (5th ed. 1984).
21 KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, § 112, at 787.
22 Id. at 785.
23 See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION §15.04 (1994).
24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 570 (1977); KEETON ET AL., supra note 20,
§ 112, at 788-93. Because most employment defamation cases concern the plaintiff's
trade or profession, the distinction between libel and slander has little practical signif-
icance in employment cases. CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EMPLOYMENT LAW 1162 (1993). However, whether the defamatory statement is libel
or slander, the elements of a defamation claim are the same.
25 Beginning with the case of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the
United States Supreme Court, recognizing the tension between defamation liability
and freedom of speech, introduced constitutional principles to defamation law. Sulli-
van held that the plaintiff, a government official, could not recover for defamatory
statements about his conduct in his official capacity unless he proved that the plain-
tiffs made the statements with "actual malice." The Court defined actual malice as
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement. Id.
at 279-80. Subsequent cases extended the actual malice requirement to defamation
of public figures. Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
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(a) a false 26 and defamatory statement;
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Court addressed defamatory
statements involving a private individual. Although the Court did not require a show-
ing of actual malice in such cases, the Court held that states could not impose strict
liability for defamation. However, the Court also held that in cases where a plaintiff
establishes fault on a showing less than actual malice, the state may not permit recov-
ery of presumed or punitive damages.
In Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 427 U.S. 749 (1985), the Court ad-
dressed a case of purely private speech in a defamation action against a credit report-
ing agency. A plurality of the Court held that, where the plaintiff was a private person
and the speech did not involve a matter of public concern, the plaintiff could recover
presumed and punitive damages without showing actual malice. The Dun & Bradstreet
plurality left open the possibility that, in purely private matters, states could use com-
mon law standards and impose strict liability for defamation.
The Supreme Court's decision in Dun & Bradstreet has created confusion as to
the extent to which constitutional standards apply to cases involving private persons
and matters of private concern, which would include most employment defamation
cases. See SMoLLA, supra note 23, at § 1.05[4] (discussing generally the lack of clarity
concerning the precise scope of Dun &Bradstreet); id. at § 15.05 (discussing impact of
constitutional decisions on the issue of truth in workplace defamation claims); id. at
§ 15.07[1]-[2] (discussing impact of constitutional decisions on issues of fault and
privilege in workplace defamation claims); see also WILLIAM J. HOLLOWAY & MICHAELJ.
LE cH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 269-73 (2d ed. 1993) (dis-
cussing varying approaches to First Amendment protection of workplace speech).
Without further clarification from the United States Supreme Court, and given that
the typical employment defamation case involves private persons and private matters
relating solely to the workplace, this Article presumes the validity of common law
principles in most employment defamation cases. Other commentators reach similar
conclusions. See, e.g., Langvardt, supra note 3, at 230 & nn.12-15 ("issues arising in the
employment termination-based defamation suit are more likely to pertain to defama-
tion's common law elements rather than to its constitutional features"); Lewis et al.,
supra note 2, at 809 ("A claim of defamation arising out of the employment relation-
ship must meet the common law standards necessary for any other type of defamation
claim."); Laurence Shore, Comment, Defamation and Employment Relationships: The New
Meanings of Private Speech, Publication, and Privileg 38 EMORY L.J. 871, 879-82 (1989)
(arguing that Dun & Bradstreet and Hepps evidence the United States Supreme
Court's unwillingness to "constitutionalize" defamation in cases involving purely pri-
vate speech, and this trend directly affects workplace defamation claims); cf. HOLLO-
WAY & LEECH, supra, at 245, 269-73 (discussing the importance of common law
defamation principles in the workplace, while noting that First Amendment princi-
ples "should be and perhaps [are] applicable'? in the workplace); SMOLLA, supra, at
§ 15.01 [3] ("Theoretically, defamation cases arising in the workplace are governed by
the same common law and constitutional rules applicable to defamation suits gener-
ally."); Larson, supra note 6, at 55 (noting that "the [Supreme] Court's unsettled in-
terpretations of the First Amendment have a direct and unavoidable effect on
workplace defamation claims," and that the Court's most recent decisions have left a
number of areas unresolved).
26 The common law presumes the falsity of the defamatory statement. See, e.g.,
Rogozinski v. Airstream by Angell, 377 A.2d 807, 814 (N.J. Super. Law Div. 1977),
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(b) an unprivileged publication to a third party;
(c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and
(d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the
existence of special harm caused by the publication.
2 7
In the workplace, a statement is defamatory if it imputes commis-
sion of a crime or impugns one's ability or fitness for his or her em-
ployment, trade or profession.2 8 Consequently, statements alleging
on-the-job or work-related misconduct,2 9 poor performance or incom-
modified, 397 A.2d 334 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1979); Memphis Publ'g Co. v. Nichols,
569 S.W.2d 412, 420 (Tenn. 1978); cf. Langvardt, supra note 3, at 230 (presumption of
falsity may still apply to employment cases because plaintiffs are private persons and
speech involved is private speech). But see Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,
475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986) (holding that "the common-law presumption that defama-
tory speech is false cannot stand when a plaintiff seeks damages against a media de-
fendant for speech of public concern"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 cmt.
b (1977) (practical effect of the common law presumption of falsity has been eroded
by Supreme Court decisions); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 613 (1977) (Restate-
ment takes no position "on the extent to which the common law rule placing on the
defendant the burden of proof to show the truth of the defamatory communication
has been changed by" constitutional requirements).
The Restatement (Second) of Torts further notes the lack of clarity in this area in
comment j to § 613:
Under the common law of defamation a defendant who relied upon the
truth of the defamatory matter published by him has consistently had the
burden of proving it. Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court
hold that under the Constitution a plaintiff must show fault on the part of
the defendant regarding the truth or falsity of the defamatory communica-
tion.... Meeting this requirement has, as a practical matter, made it neces-
sary for the plaintiff to allege and prove the falsity of the communication,
and from a realistic standpoint, has placed the burden of proving falsity on
the plaintiff.
When the point is specifically raised before it, the Supreme Court may
well expressly hold as a matter of constitutional law that the plaintiff has the
burden of alleging and proving falsity.
[T]he constitutional requirement of proof of fault may turn out not to
be imposed in every case of a defamatory communication. If there are some
situations where fault is not required, the States will be free to apply their
own rules, and they may or may not continue to apply the traditional com-
mon law rule.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 613 cmt. j (1977) (citations omitted).
27 Haworth v. Feignon, 623 A.2d 150, 156 (Me. 1993); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 558 (1977).
28 HoLLoWAY & LEECH, supra note 25, at 245-46.
29 See, e.g., Ritter v. Pepsi Cola, 785 F. Supp. 61 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (drinking alcohol
on the job); Kelly v. General Tel. Co., 186 Cal. Rptr. 184 (Ct. App. 1982) (misuse of
company funds by purchasing materials without proper authorization); Rabideau v.
Albany Med. Ctr. Hosp., 600 N.Y.S.2d 825 (App. Div. 1993) (unauthorized possession
of or misappropriation of the employer's property.)
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petence, 30 attitudinal problems,31 criminal activity,3 2 dishonesty, 33 or
falsification of records34 may be actionable.3 5 Because defamatory
statements in the workplace frequently relate to an employee's com-
petence, 36 routine communications regarding employee performance
can be springboards for defamation claims. 37 Similarly, statements
30 See, e.g., Agarwal v. Johnson, 603 P.2d 58, 65 (Cal. 1979) ("lack ofjob knowl-
edge"); Patton v. Royal Indus., Inc., 70 Cal. Rptr. 44,46 (Ct. App. 1968) (letter stating
plaintiffs were "replaced with personnel having more experience and knowledge");
Sigal Constr. Corp. v. Stanbury, 586 A.2d 1204, 1206 (D.C. 1991) (statements describ-
ing a project manager as "detail oriented... to the point of losing sight of the big
picture" and commenting that "with a large staff [he] might be a very competent P.M.
[project manager]"); Garren v. The Southland Corp., 228 S.E.2d 870, 871 (Ga. 1976)
(store employee "discharged for shortages"); Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297
N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. 1980) (plaintiff described as a "poor salesperson" who was
"not industrious.., would not get products out, was hard to motivate and could not
sell"); Konowitz v. Archway Sch., Inc., 409 N.Y.S.2d 757 (App. Div. 1978) (teacher
described as "not effective enough with the difficult children"); Berg v. Consolidated
Freightways, Inc., 421 A.2d 831, 833 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (plaintiff was "relieved of
his duties and he was fired for not being able to handle his job correctly").
31 See, e.g., Agarwa4 603 P.2d at 65 ("lack of cooperation").
32 See, e.g., Krasinski v. United Parcel Serv., 530 N.E.2d 468, 469 (Ill. 1988) (theft);
Kelly, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 186 (statements that plaintiff falsified invoices implied he com-
mitted the crime of forgery); Berg v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 421 A.2d 831, 833 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1980) (statements alleging plaintiff was involved with stealing combined
with the fact that employer terminated him while a criminal investigation of the thefts
was taking place).
33 See, e.g., Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336, 1340 (Colo. 1988)
(plaintiff's alleged failure to report that she had been cleared to return to work fol-
lowing an illness); Krasinski, 530 N.E.2d at 469 (allegations of theft as basis for dismis-
sal for dishonesty).
34 See, e.g., Kelly v. General Tel. Co., 186 Cal. Rptr. 184 (Ct. App. 1982) (falsified
invoices); Romano v. United Buckingham Freight Lines, 484 P.2d 450 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1971) (falsified time and mileage logs); Zinda v. Louisiana Pac. Corp., 440
N.W.2d 548 (Wisc. 1989) (falsified employment forms).
35 While actionable, such statements may be conditionally privileged. See discus-
sion infra Part II.B.2.
36 0. Lee Reed &Jan W. Henkel, Facilitating the Flow of Truthful Personnel Informa-
tion: Some Needed Change in the Standard Required to Overcome the Qualified Privilege to
Defame, 26 Am. Bus. L.J. 305, 308 (1988) (contrasting employment defamation to
other types of defamation, noting that employment defamation usually impugns the
plaintiff's competence rather than his or her character, although workplace state-
ments imputing criminal conduct may defame character as well as competence.)
37 As two employment termination experts have noted, "Statements that are le-
gally defamatory are uttered in the workplace every day. They may be found in busi-
ness correspondence concerning requests for references and in records of
performance evaluations. They may be recorded at or recalled from informal meet-
ings where there is comment upon why someone was let go or whether someone who
voluntarily quit will be missed." HOLLOWAY & LEECH, supra note 25, at 244. More-
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concerning termination for misconduct may also form the basis for
defamation actions. Such statements will be "almost inevitably defam-
atory in that [a statement regarding misconduct] tends to lower the
former employee in the estimation of the community (e.g. other em-
ployees) or that [such a statement] deters third parties (e.g. prospec-
tive employers) from dealing with the former employee as a job
applicant."38
Publication is an essential element of a defamation claim.3 9 It
requires that the statement be communicated to someone other than
the defamed plaintiff.4° As a general rule, there is no publication if
the defamed person communicates the statement.41 However, courts
have recognized an exception to the general rule, allowing defama-
tion claims based on the plaintiff's foreseeable republication of the
defamatory statement.42
The typical case involves a plaintiff who receives a defamatory let-
ter and requires assistance in reading or understanding it.43 Self-pub-
lication occurs when the plaintiff asks another person to read the
letter. For example, in Lane v. Schilling,44 the defendant wrote a de-
famatory letter to the plaintiff, who was blind. The plaintiff asked a
over, the proliferation of wrongful termination actions has brought with it an increase
in defamation claims, which are commonly included in the complaints of dismissed
employees. DERTOUZOS ET AL., supra note 3, at 10 ("[I]t is now common for dis-
charged employees suing for wrongful discharge ... to include in their suits claims
for slander or libel ... "). As one plaintiff's lawyer noted: "Spread the word. Every
wrongful discharge case must be looked at as a defamation case." Middleton, supra
note 6, at 30 (quoting plaintiff's lawyer Paul H. Tobias, founder of the Plaintiff Em-
ployment Lawyers Association).
38 Reed & Henkel, supra note 36, at 316.
39 Weidman v. Ketcham, 15 N.E.2d 426, 427 (N.Y. 1938); Lyle v. Waddle, 88
S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex. 1945); Live Oak Publ'g Co. v. Cohagan, 286 Cal. Rptr. 198, 201
(Ct. App. 1991); KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, § 113, at 797.
40 KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, § 113, at 802; SMOLLA, supra note 23, at
§§ 4.12[1], 15.02[1].
41 See Munsell v. Ideal Food Stores, 494 P.2d 1063, 1072 (Kan. 1972); Taylor v.
Jones Bros. Bakery, 68 S.E. 2d 313, 314 (N.C. 1951), overruled inpart on other grounds by
Hinson v. Dawson, 92 S.E.2d 393, 397 (N.C. 1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 577(1) (1977) (stating general rule); KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, at § 113 (stating
general rule).
42 See, e.g., Belcher v. Little, 315 N.W.2d 734 (Iowa 1982); Davis v. Askin's Retail
Stores, Inc., 191 S.E. 33 (N.C. 1937); Hedgpeth v. Coleman, 111 S.E. 517 (N.C. 1922);
Bretz v. Mayer, 203 N.E.2d 665 (Ohio 1963); Lane v. Schilling, 279 P. 267 (Or. 1929);
KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, § 113, at 802.
43 E.g., Lane, 279 P. at 267 (blind plaintiff); Davis v. Askins Retail Stores, Inc., 191
S.E. 33 (N.C. 1937) (17-year-old plaintiff described as an "inexperienced youth");
Hedgpeth v. Coleman, 111 S.E. 517 (N.C. 1922) (14-year-old plaintiff).
44 Lane, 279 P. at 267.
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friend to read the letter to him. The plaintiff also asked his wife, who
had been out of town when he received the letter, to read it as well.
The court concluded that each publication by the plaintiff was fore-
seeable because the defendant knew the plaintiff was blind. Further,
because the plaintiff would require someone else to read the letter,
his publication was compelled by the circumstances.
Courts also have applied the exception to defamatory letters sent
to children. In such cases, the necessity of self-publication arises be-
cause of fear or coercion. In Hedgpeth v. Coleman,45 the fourteen-year-
old plaintiff received a note from his employer accusing him of theft
and threatening him with imprisonment. The boy showed the letter
to his brother, who in turn showed it to their father. The court re-
jected the defendant's argument that the libel claim failed as a matter
of law because plaintiff had published the letter. Comparing the case
to cases of letters sent to persons who were blind or unable to read,
the court found the requisite causal relationship and necessity. Not-
ing that the necessity need not be based on a physical condition, the
court observed that "a threat may operate so powerfully upon the
mind of an immature boy as to amount to coercion; and when an act
is done through coercion, it is not voluntary."46
Thus, the exception traditionally applied to cases in which the
defendant wrote a defamatory letter to a person with limited capacity
to read or understand it. The writer was aware of the addressee's inca-
pacity and knew or should have known that he would require another
person's assistance in reading the letter. Because courts have con-
cluded this type of self-publication is foreseeable and necessary, the
statement's originator can be held liable for the plaintiff's
republication.
Such cases are based on principles similar to exceptions to the
publication rules set forth in comments k and m to section 577 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. These comments explain the role of fore-
seeability in determining whether publication has occurred. Com-
ment k focuses primarily on foreseeability of publication to a third
person as determinative of whether the originator of the statement
has intentionally or negligently communicated the defamatory state-
ment to a third person. Comment k provides:
45 111 S.E. 517 (N.C. 1922).
46 Id. at 520; see also Davis v. Askin's Retail Stores, Inc., 191 S.E. 33 (N.C. 1937)
(publication requirement satisfied where "inexperienced youth" who received a letter
accusing him of theft and threatening criminal prosecution showed the letters to
others and sought their advice).
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Intentional or negligent publication. There is an intent to publish
defamatory matter when the actor does an act for the purpose of
communicating it to a third person or with knowledge that it is sub-
stantially certain to be so communicated.
It is not necessary, however, that the communication to a third
person be intentional. If a reasonable person would recognize that
an act creates an unreasonable risk that the defamatory matter will
be communicated to a third person, the conduct becomes a negli-
gent communication. A negligent communication amounts to a
publication just as effectively as an intentional communication.
4 7
Comment m addresses self-publication. The comment sets forth
the general rule that the defamed person's communication of the de-
famatory statement ordinarily does not constitute publication. How-
ever, the comment provides an exception where the defamed person
communicates the statement to another person without knowing that
the statement is defamatory, and such a publication was foreseeable by
the statement's originator. Comment m provides:
Recipient is the defamed person. One who communicates defama-
tory matter directly to the defamed person, who himself communi-
cates it to a third person, has not published the matter to the third
person if there are no other circumstances. If the defamed person's
transmission of the communication to the third person was made,
however, without an awareness of the defamatory nature of the mat-
ter and if the circumstances indicated that communication to a
third party would be likely, a publication may be properly held to
have occurred.
48
Subsequent cases imported these theories to the workplace, creat-
ing a new avenue for defamation liability in discharge cases. 49 How-
ever, some courts and commentators have criticized reliance on
comments m and k as the theoretical justification for the compelled
self-publication doctrine. Critics note that comment k's foreseeability
standard deals with negligent publication, not compulsion.50 More-
over, critics emphasize that comment m, which describes compelled
publication, requires that the defamed person must be unaware of the
47 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 cmt. k (1977) (emphasis omitted) (ci-
tation omitted).
48 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 cmt. m (1977) (emphasis omitted).
49 See infra discussion Part II.C.1.
50 E.g., Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336, 1354 (Colo. 1988) (Erik-
son,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Doe v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,
855 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. App. 1993), af/'d on other grounds, 903 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1995);
Mouser, supra note 4, at 259-60, 264-65.
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defamatory nature of the statement.5 1 In workplace compelled self-
publication, the discharged employee is well aware of the defamatory
nature of the reasons for termination. For some courts, the awareness
factor is a fatal flaw in the workplace self-publication doctrine. For
other courts, the comments provide ample justification for expanding
defamation liability in the workplace.
B. Defenses to Workplace Defamation Claims
Employers can defend defamation claims by asserting that the de-
famatory statement is true, plaintiff consented to the publication of
the statement, or the statement was privileged.
1. Truth
To be actionable, a defamatory statement must be false.52 Under
common law principles, truth is an affirmative defense, with the bur-
den of pleading and proof borne by the defendant. 53 In a case in
which the defamatory statement is true, the defendant escapes liabil-
ity.5 4 In addition, the statement does not have to be literally true.
Substantial truth may be sufficient.55 As long as the "gist" or "sting" of
51 E.g., Churchey, 759 P.2d at 1354-1355 (Erikson, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part); Doe, 855 S.W.2d at 248; Mouser, supra note 4, at 259-60, 264-65.
52 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977); KEETON ET AL., supra note 20,
§ 116, at 839.
53 See, e.g., Churchey, 759 P.2d at 1341 (treating truth as affirmative defense in
compelled self-publication defamation claim); Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y
of the U.S., 389 N.W.2d 876, 888-89 (Minn. 1986) (same); Rogozinski v. Airstream by
Angell, 377 A.2d 807, 814 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977). But see Philadelphia News-
papers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (holding that private figure plaintiff bears the
burden of proving falsity in a defamation action against a media defendant for speech
of public concern). The allocation of the burden in employment cases thus will de-
pend on whether the traditional common law approach or constitutional principles
apply. HOLLOWAY & LEECH, supra note 25, at 272 (noting that some jurisdictions util-
ize common law approach whereas other jurisdictions apply constitutional standards
and reallocate burden of proof); cf. Langvardt, supra note 3, at 236 n.37 (concluding
that because the usual employment defamation case is unlikely to involve matters of
public concern or media defendants, courts probably would not require employee-
plaintiffs to prove falsity).
54 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A (1977); KEETON ET AL., supra note 20,
§ 116, at 839-42; see also Watkins v. Laser/Print Atlanta, Inc., 358 S.E.2d 477, 479 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1987).
55 See, e.g., Wehling v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 721 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1983); Inter-
national Adm'rs, Inc. v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 564 F. Supp. 1247, 1255 (N.D. Ill.
1983).
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the statement is proven true, the defendant will have a complete
defense. 5
6




As a matter of policy, the law seeks to promote candid and open
communication in the workplace. 58 The workplace qualified privilege
furthers that policy by permitting employers to discuss personnel mat-
ters freely by protecting employers from defamation liability in appro-
priate circumstances. Generally, the privilege protects defamatory
communications between employers and employees, between manag-
ers and supervisors, and references given by former employers to pro-
spective employers. 59  Because the privilege is qualified or
conditional, the defendant who abuses the privilege is not protected.
Thus, an employer who acts with malice, 60 or who exceeds the scope
of the privilege by communicating the defamatory statement to per-
sons who do not need to know, or for reasons other than the purpose
of the privilege61 loses protection.
56 See, e.g., Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc., 623 F.2d 616, 619 (9th Cir.
1980); International Adm'rs, Inc. v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 564 F. Supp. 1247, 1255
(N.D. Ill. 1983) (citing Kilbane v. Sabonjian, 347 N.E.2d 757, 761 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976);
KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, § 116, at 842.
57 Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336, 1341 (Colo. 1988); Lewis v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 389 N.W.2d 876, 889 (Minn. 1986); R-
STATE MNT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 617 (1977).
58 Pamela G. Posey, Note, Employer Defamation: The Role of Qualified Privilege, 30
WM. & MARY L. REv. 469, 484 (1989).
59 RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 594-96 (1977).
60 Depending on state law, malice can be based on the employer's motivation for
making the statement or the employer's attitude toward the statement's truth or fal-
sity. Courts focusing on motivation typically define malice as ill will, spite or im-
proper motive. For courts focusing on truth or falsity, malice requires a showing of
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the statement's truth or falsity, similar to
the standard of constitutional cases. Alternatively, some courts focus on both attitude
toward the plaintiff and attitude toward the statement's truth or falsity. See generally
Daniloff, supra note 7, at 708-12 (describing and critiquing qualified privilege stan-
dards); Posey, supra, note 58, at 487-91 (1989) (discussing qualified privilege stan-
dards); Donald Paul Duffala, Annotation, Defamation: Loss of Employer's Qualified
Privilege to Publish Employee's Work Record or Qualification, 24 A.L.R. 4th 144 (1983).
61 E.g., Atkins Ford Sales, Inc. v. Royster, 560 So. 2d 197, 201 (Ala. 1990) (no
privilege for employer's communication of accusation of theft to accused employee's
parents and to replacement employee); Zinda v. Louisiana Pac. Corp., 440 N.W.2d
548, 553 (Wis. 1988) (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 604 (1977) for
the rule that a privilege may be abused by publication to "some person not reasonably
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Qualified privilege is an affirmative defense, to be pled and
proven by the employer.62 Once the employer establishes the exist-
ence of qualified privilege, the employee, bearing the burden of
proof, can overcome the privilege by demonstrating that the employer
abused the privilege.63 Whether the privilege exists in a particular
case is a question of law for the court, unless there is a dispute regard-




Absolute privilege protects defamatory statements, regardless of
the speaker's motives or knowledge of falsity. 66 Absolute privilege
generally applies to statements made in judicial and quasijudicial pro-
ceedings, legislative proceedings, and communications by executive
government officers in the course of their duties. 67 While these abso-
lute principles do not apply to most employment defamation cases,
grievance proceedings in public employment or collective bargaining
and employment-related proceedings before administrative agencies
may be treated as quasijudicial proceedings subject to absolute privi-
lege.68 Because compelled self-publication claims are based on com-
munications between terminated employees and prospective
believed to be necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose of the particular
privilege"); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, § 115, at 835; SMOLLA, supra note 23,
at § 15.07[2] [a].
62 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 613 (1977); KEETON ET AL., supra note 20,
§ 115, at 835.
63 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 613 (1977); KEETON ET AL., supra note 20,
§ 115, at 835.
64 E.g., Schneider v. Pay 'N Save Corp., 723 P.2d 619, 624 (Alaska 1986); Turner
v. Halliburton Co., 722 P.2d 1106, 1113 (Kan. 1986);Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 350
A.2d 688, 700 (Md. 1976); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 619 (1977); KEETON ET
AL., supra note 20, § 115, at 835.
65 E.g., Schneider, 723 P.2d at 624; Turner, 722 P.2d at 1113; Jacron Sales Co., 350
A.2d at 698; Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Minn. 1980);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 619 (1977); KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, § 115,
at 835.
66 HOLLOWAY & LEECH, supra note 25, at 257; KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, § 114,
at 816.
67 HOLLOWAY & LEECH, supra note 25, at 257; KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, § 114,
at 815-23.
68 HOLLOWAY & LEECH, supra note 25, at 257 n.250 (civil service and other public
employees); SMOLLA, supra note 23, § 15.07[2] [a] [i] (1994) (grievance proceedings
under collective bargaining agreements; unemployment agency proceedings; equal
employment opportunity commission).
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employers, such claims seem unlikely to fall within the absolute privi-
lege rubric.
4. Consent
The plaintiff's consent to the publication of a defamatory state-
ment provides the employer with an almost absolute defense. The
consent defense applies where an employee has invited or instigated
the defamatory communication. 69 For example, an employee who
agrees to the presence of others as an employer explains disciplinary
action may be deemed to have consented to the employer's publica-
tion of defamatory statements to those present.70 In addition, some
courts consider an employee's agreement to participate in evaluations
as consent to the publication of defamatory statements.
7'
While consent sometimes is referred to as an absolute privilege, it
is not an unlimited one. The consent defense applies to statements
that are within the scope of the consent given by the plaintiff.72 For
example, if the consent pertained to performance evaluations, the
privilege would not extend to publication of defamatory statements
beyond that context.
C. Development of an Exception
for Self-Published Defamation in the Workplace
1. Where Few Courts Had Gone Before:
A Chronology of Early Cases Permitting Plaintiffs to
Maintain Defamation Actions Based on Self-Publication
A growing minority of courts have relaxed the publication re-
quirement in cases of workplace defamation, adopting varying ver-
sions of the doctrine of "compelled self-publication." 73 The principles
69 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, § 114, at 823; HOLLOWAY & LEECH, supra note
25, at 260-61.
70 See e.g., Merritt v. Detroit Mem'l Hosp., 265 N.W.2d 124 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
71 E.g., Sobel v. Wingard, 531 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
72 KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, § 114, at 823.
73 Courts also vary on terminology. Some courts refer to the tort as "self-defama-
tion," "compelled self-defamation" or "self-compelled defamation." E.g., Purcell v.
Seguin State Bank & Trust Co., 999 F.2d 950, 959 (5th Cir. 1993) ("self-compelled
defamation"); Weldy v. Piedmont Airlines, Inc., No. CIV-88-628E, 1989 WL 158342, at
*2 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1989), aff'd, 1991 WL 5147 (W.D.N.Y., Jan. 15, 1991); rev'd
mem., 1992 WL 73175 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1992), rev'd and remanded on other grounds
985 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1993) ("compelled self-defamation"); Layne v. Builders Plumbing
Supply Co., 569 N.E.2d 1104, 1110 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) ("compelled self-defamation");
Doe v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 855 S.W.2d 248, 259 (Tex. App. 1993), affd on
other grounds, 903 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1995) ("self-defamation").
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of compelled self-publication permit an employee who is discharged
and given allegedly defamatory reasons for the termination to bring a
defamation action against the former employer, if the employee re-
peats the defamatory communication to a prospective employer in a
job interview. Courts that permit workplace defamation claims to pro-
ceed on the self-publication theory espouse two views of what consti-
tutes actionable publication. Some courts require only that the
repetition in a job interview situation be reasonably foreseeable.74
Others, following the leading case of Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society of the United States,75 require the self-publishing plaintiff to prove
not only foreseeability of self-publication, but also a "strong compul-
sion" to repeat the defamation under the circumstances. 76 Liability
may result even if the previous employer communicated the statement
directly to the employee and to no one else.
This potentially expansive theory developed in a number of cases
which share the following common threads: egregious or unreasona-
ble employer conduct, sympathetic plaintiffs and defamation as the
only avenue of legal recourse. The chronology that follows trains a
sharply detailed focus on the facts of key self-publication cases, re-
vealing this pattern.
74 See, e.g., Grist v. Upjohn Co., 168 N.W.2d 389, 405-06 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969)
(concluding that publication may occur when the defendant "intends or has reason
to suppose that in the ordinary course of events the matter will come to the knowl-
edge of some third person"); Neighbors v. Kirksville College of Osteopathic Med., 694
S.W.2d 822, 825 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) ("defendants had reason to know that in the
ordinary course of events the letter would be read by third parties"); First State Bank
of Corpus Christi v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (focusing on the
likelihood of disclosure).
75 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986).
76 See, e.g., McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89, 94-95 (Ct. App.
1980) (reversing demurrer on the issue of publication where employee was "under a
strong compulsion to disclose" defamatory statements to third parties and such disclo-
sure to third parties was "reasonably foreseeable" to the defendants); Churchey v.
Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336, 1347 (Colo. 1988) (holding that the publication
element "can be established by self-publication if... it was foreseeable to the defend-
ant that the plaintiff would be under a strong compulsion to publish the defamatory
statement"); Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d
876, 888 (Minn. 1986) (holding that the publication element of defamation "may be
satisfied where the plaintiff was compelled to publish a defamatory statement to a
third person if it was foreseeable to the defendant that the plaintiff would be so com-
pelled"); Downs v. Waremart, Inc., 903 P.2d 888, 896 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (plaintiff
may assert claim where "it was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that the plain-
tiff would be under a strong compulsion to disclose the content of that statement to
prospective employers").
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An early case permitting a workplace defamation claim based on
self-publication was Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Barrett,77 a 1946 decision by
the Georgia Court of Appeals. Barrett brought a libel claim against
Colonial Stores based on statements made by the employer in a "cer-
tificate of availability" provided to prospective employers. The regula-
tions of the War Manpower Commission required discharged
employees to obtain such certificates upon discharge, and eligibility
for new employment was conditioned upon having an unrestricted
certificate or referral from the United States Employment Service. 78
In Barrett's case, Colonial Stores provided a restricted certificate, stat-
ing he had been discharged because of "improper conduct toward
fellow employees."79 When Barrett presented the certificate to several
prospective employers, they refused to hire him based on the state-
ments in the certificate80
On the issue of publication, the court acknowledged that Colo-
nial Stores had neither shown the certificate nor disclosed its content
to anyone other than Barrett.8 ' Accordingly, under the general rule,
there was no publication by the defendant. However, the court noted
the existence of exceptions to the general rule:
Printing a libel is regarded as a publication when possession of the
printed matter is delivered with the expectation that it will be read
by some third person, provided that such result actually follows.
The rule, that there is no publication when words are communi-
cated only to the person defamed, is subject to exception or qualifi-
cation. Thus, in the case of a libel, whether the general rule
extends to a disclosure by the person libeled, is to be determined by
the causal relation existing between the libel and the publication.
There may be a publication where the sender intends or has reason
to suppose that the communication will reach third persons, which
happens, or which result naturally flows from the sending. This
rule is particularly applied in cases where the act of disclosure arises
from necessity.
8 2
The court found Barrett's claim within the exception. Colonial
Stores knew when it gave Barrett the certificate that he would present
77 38 S.E.2d 306 (Ga. Ct. App. 1946).
78 Id. at 307. The certificate of availability requirement existed during World War
II. The War Manpower Commission required persons seeking employment to pres-
ent such certificates to prospective employers. SMOLLA, supra note 23,
§ 15.02[3] [b] [i] (1994).
79 Colonial Stores, 38 S.E.2d at 308.
80 Id. at 307-08.
81 Id. at 307.
82 Id. (quoting 36 Coapus Ju~is § 172, at 1225).
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it to prospective employers as required by the regulations of the War
Manpower Commission.8 3 Accordingly, Colonial Stores must have ex-
pected prospective employers to read the certificate.8 4 Necessity of
disclosure also was apparent from the facts, since Barrett was required
by law to disclose the contents of the certificate to prospective employ-
ers.8 5 With publication thus established, Colonial Stores would be lia-
ble unless the certificate was privileged. The court ultimately held the
certificate was not privileged.
8 6
In its discussion of the privilege issue, the Georgia Court of Ap-
peals focused on the facts surrounding Barrett's discharge. Barrett
had been a twenty-year employee of Colonial Stores, with a record of
commendations and no involvement in trouble or disputes. 87 In fact,
Barrett was well-liked by his co-workers as well as the officers of Colo-
nial Stores.88 Before Barrett's discharge, however, he was unfairly and
falsely labeled an aggressor because he intervened as a peacemaker in
an off-work, after-hours argument started by a drunken fellow em-
ployee.8 9 When Barrett attempted to settle the dispute, the intoxi-
cated employee "made an unprovoked assault upon Barrett,"90 who
struck the aggressor in self-defense. 91 The court did not find Colonial
Stores' interpretation of the events credible. Instead, the judges ob-
83 Id. at 308.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 The privilege analysis focused on what the court considered to be an absolute
privilege based on language in the regulations prescribing the content of a certificate
of availability. The regulations provided that the certificate "shall contain only the
individual's name, address, social security account number, if any, the name and ad-
dress of the issuing employer, or War Manpower Commission officer and office, the
date of issuance, a statement as to whether or not the individual's last employment
was in a critical occupation, and such other information not pr4udicial to the employee in
seeking new employment as may be authorized or required by the War Manpower Com-
mission." Id (emphasis added). The court interpreted the regulations as prohibiting
prejudicial statements in the certificates. Because Barrett's certificate included the
statement of improper conduct which led prospective employers to refuse to hire
him, the court concluded the certificate was not absolutely privileged, since it con-
tained prejudicial information contrary to the regulations. Id. at 308-09.
The court also addressed, but did not decide, the issue of conditional privilege,
observing there was sufficient evidence of malice to authorize a jury finding that the
allegations of improper conduct were not only false, but maliciously made. Id. at 309.
87 Id. at 308. Colonial Stores awarded honor badges to employees with good ser-
vice records over five year periods. Barrett already had received three honor badges,






BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD CASE
served "[i] t appears that Barrett, instead of being guilty of 'improper
conduct toward his fellow employees,' was doing his best to protect
them and to peacefully settle their quarrel."
92
Although not directly stated by the court, the result in Colonial
Stores appears to turn to a large extent on these egregious facts. In
essence, it is a case of unfair and unreasonable conduct by an em-
ployer. Colonial Stores fired Barrett, a long-term employee with an
exemplary service record and no prior history of trouble, based on an
incident in which he intervened as a peacemaker and struck his at-
tacker only in self-defense. While Barrett perhaps would have been
better off avoiding the conflict, the facts do not support the character-
ization of his conduct as improper and grounds for discharge. The
fact that the incident occurred away from the employer's premises
and after working hours further underscores the weakness and lack of
justification for the employer's position. Given Barrett's nearly twenty
years of exemplary service, the employer, exercising good faith and
fairness, could have taken less severe action than termination-if dis-
cipline were necessary. Further, Colonial Stores memorialized its false
characterization in the certificate, knowing the certificate contained
false statements that would prejudice Barrett in his attempts to obtain
other employment. 93 Based on the facts, the employer's characteriza-
tion of Barrett's conduct was untenable. Discharging Barrett under
questionable circumstances and recording these weak reasons in the
availability certificate seemed unreasonable and unfair at best, and in
bad faith at worst.
The result in Colonial Stores also may be a product of its time.94
Written in 1946, Colonial Stores is an opinion from an era governed by
the rule of employment at will, 95 and the modern trend of eroding
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 In more recent decisions, Georgia courts have distinguished Colonial Stores on
the grounds that the War Manpower Commission regulations compelled Barrett to
publish the reasons for termination. The courts have held employees' publications
were voluntary where regulations did not require them to provide prospective em-
ployers with reasons for termination. See Sigrnon v. Womack, 279 S.E.2d 254, 257 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1981); Brantley v. Heller, 112 S.E.2d 685, 689 (Ga. Ct. App. 1960); infra text
accompanying notes 198-206.
95 Traditionally, employment for an indefinite term is employment at will.
Under the rule of employment at will, either the employer or employee can terminate
the relationship at any time for any reason, or for no reason at all. See, e.g., Wagensel-
ler v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1030-31 (Ariz. 1985); Murphy v. Ameri-
can Home Prods., Inc., 448 N.E.2d 86, 89 (N.Y. 1983). Thus, where employment is at
will, an employer can discharge an employee, or an employee can resign at any time
without notice.
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this rule was decades away.96 As an at-will employee,97 Barrett would
have no remedy for the discharge itself, regardless of the egregious-
ness of the employer's conduct. An action for libel was the only avail-
able avenue to seek redress for the employer's unfair conduct. Of
course, the libel action would have been unavailable if the court had
followed the general rule precluding self-publication claims. By apply-
ing an exception to the self-publication rule, the court redressed gross
misconduct that would otherwise have passed without a remedy.98
Georgia law provides a firmly entrenched statutory at-will rule. GA. CODE ANN.
§ 34-7-1 (1992). The code section, enacted in 1895, derives from Magarahan v. Wright,
10 S.E. 584 (Ga. 1889).
96 Under traditional principles of employment at will, employers had virtually un-
checked power to terminate workers. Absent some independent misconduct by the
employer or expressed agreement regarding the terms of employment, at will employ-
ees had no legal grounds for challenging the reasons or manner of termination.
Eventually, Congress enacted statutes that provided increased protection for workers.
The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1995), and collective bargaining
agreements provided just cause and other protections for unionized employees. Con-
gress addressed discriminatory terminations with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1995) (prohibiting discharge based on race, color, sex, na-
tional origin, and religion); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 621 (1995) (prohibiting discriminatory discharge of employees who are 40 years of
age or older); the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1995) (prohibiting
federal employers from discharging employees on the basis of disability); and the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1995) (prohibiting private
sector and state government employers from discrimination against qualified individ-
uals with disabilities). Correspondingly, states also were enacting their own legislation
prohibiting discriminatory terminations.
Courts took longer to chip away at the at-will rule. Before the late 1970s, very few
courts ventured into common law aspects of wrongful termination. However, by the
mid-1980s, wrongful termination law had developed into a dynamic, fast-growing
field, with courts increasingly carving out contract and tort exceptions to the pre-
sumptive rule of employment at will. Currently, wrongful termination lawsuits typi-
cally include multiple causes of action, often sounding in tort. See Dennis P. Duffy,
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Employment at Will: The Case Against "Tortifi-
cation" of Labor and Employment Law, 74 B.U. L. REv. 387, 390 (1994). Frequently, the
tort causes of action are defamation claims. DERTouzos, supra note 3, at 14.
For a general discussion of the erosion of the employment at will rule, see gener-
ally Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947 (1984);
Peter Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment as a Case Study of the Breakdown of
Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REV. 323 (1986); William L. Mauk, Wrongful Discharge: The
Erosion of 100 Years of Employer Privilege, 21 IDAHo L. REv. 201 (1985).
97 Barrett apparently was an at-will employee. The court's opinion does not indi-
cate he was covered by a collective bargaining agreement or an individual written
contract.
98 While Colonial Stores set the stage for subsequent application of the self-publica-
tion doctrine to the workplace, Colonial Stores itself did not represent a significant
departure from traditional defamation principles. The circumstances of publication
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The theory of self-publication also fared well in California, a state
that has recognized numerous exceptions to employment at will.99
The California Court of Appeal "(First District) recognized the com-
pelled self-publication doctrine in McKinney v. County of Santa Clara.00
McKinney brought an action for libel, slander and wrongful dismissal
arising out of his being discharged from hisjob as a probationary dep-
uty sheriff. He based his libel and slander causes of action on his com-
munication of allegedly defamatory statements' 0 ' concerning his job
performance to police departments where he applied for jobs.10 2 In
his complaint, McKinney alleged his superiors made the defamatory
statements "maliciously." 0 3 McKinney argued the republication "was
not voluntary but, rather, required of him as a practical matter by the
police agencies at which he applied for a new job.' 0 4 However, be-
cause McKinney himself had republished the defamatory statements,
the trial court dismissed the defamation claims.105
The Court of Appeal reversed the dismissal of the libel and slan-
der causes of action. Looking to the law of other jurisdictions, 0 6 the
in Colonial Stores are close to the traditional foreseeable publication exception. As one
scholar has observed, "It is worth noting that Colonial Stores represented only a modest
advance on the traditional exception embodying foreseeable repetition to third per-
sons, since the defamatory statement was written on a document which by law was
required to be shown to future employers." SMOLLA, supra note 23, § 15.02[3] [b] [i]
(1994). The Georgia Court of Appeals emphasized the legal compulsion aspect of
Colonial Stores to distinguish subsequent cases. See Sigmon v. Womack, 279 S.E.2d 254
(Ga. Ct. App. 1981); Brantley v. Heller, 112 S.E.2d 685 (Ga. Ct. App. 1960); infra text
accompanying notes 198-206.
99 California has a statutory presumption of at-will employment. CAL. LAB. C.
§ 2922 (West 1989). However, California common law recognizes exceptions to the at
will rule: implied-in-fact contracts, implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
and wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. See Foley v. Interactive Data
Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
100 168 Cal. Rptr. 89 (Ct. App. 1980).
101 The appellate court did not discuss the content of the alleged defamatory
statements. Id.
102 Id.
103 Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, at 3-6, McKinney v. County of Santa
Clara, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89 (Ct. App. 1980) (No. 366348).
104 McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89, 91 (Ct. App. 1980).
105 Id.
106 The court noted that the issue of alleged foreseeable republications raised a
question of first impression in California. Id. The court relied principally on two
cases which it found analogous to McKinney-Colonial Stores v. Barrett, 38 S.E.2d (Ga.
Ct. App. 1946), and Grist v. Upjohn Co., 168 N.W.2d 389 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969) (court
upheld discharged plaintiff's slander claim based on foreseeable publication by plain-
tiff to prospective employers). However, a subsequent Michigan case, Merritt v. Detroit
Mem'lHosp., 265 N.W.2d 124 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978), casts some doubt upon Grist. In
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court noted "a well recognized exception"10 7 to the rule that relieved
the originator of a defamatory statement of liability where the person
defamed disclosed the statement to a third party. The court found
that the exception applied "where the originator of the defamatory
statement has reason to believe that the person defamed will be under
a strong compulsion to disclose the contents of the defamatory state-
ment to a third person after he has read it or been informed of its
contents."1 0 8 The court emphasized the causal connection between
damage resulting from foreseeable republication and the originator's
conduct as key to liability:
The rationale for making the originator of a defamatory statement
liable for its foreseeable republication is the strong causal link be-
tween the actions of the originator and the damage caused by the
publication. This causal link is no less strong where the foreseeable
republication is made by the person defamed operating under a
strong compulsion to republish the defamatory statement and the
circumstances which create the strong compulsion are known to the
originator of the defamatory statement at the time he communi-
cates it to the person defamed. 10 9
Initially the workplace self-publication doctrine developed pri-
marily in decisions of intermediate appellate courts. 110 In 1986, the
Minnesota Supreme Court decided Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance So-
ciety of the United States,"' which has become the leading case on com-
pelled self-publication.
Plaintiffs Carole Lewis, Mary Smith, Michelle Rafferty and Su-
zanne Loizeaux worked as claim approvers in Equitable's St. Paul,
Minnesota, office. They were at-will employees, hired in the spring of
Mer-itt, the court viewed plaintiff's self-publication as unforeseeable. Further, the
court concluded that because plaintiff herself disclosed the reasons for termination,
she had consented to the communication, and thus, the statements were absolutely
privileged. Id. at 126-27. For a general discussion advocating treatment of self-publi-
cation as consent, see Doug W. Ray, Note, A Unified Theory for Consent and Compelled
Self-Publication in Employee Defamation: Economic Duress in Tort Law, 67 TEx. L. REv. 1295
(1989).
107 McKinney, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
108 Id. at 93-94.
109 Id.
110 One exception was Lunz v. Neuman, 290 P.2d 697 (Wash. 1955). In that case,
the plaintiff's former employer accused him of theft. However, the court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that he was required to disseminate the theft accusations when
applying forjobs. The court relied on the "well settled" rule that "a slander or libel is
not published by the communication thereof to the defamed person alone." Id at 701
(citation omitted).
111 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986).
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1980.112 In September 1980, the company sent them to assist claim
approvers in Equitable's Pittsburgh office. The plaintiffs had never
traveled on company business, and the St. Paul office manager was
responsible for instructing them about company travel policies. The
manager, who was out of town, delegated the task to personnel who
had no experience training employees about travel policies and who
gave the plaintiffs insufficient information.11 3
Upon their return from the Pittsburgh office, management com-
mended plaintiffs for their performance there. Management also told
plaintiffs for the first time that they were required to submit expense
reports for their daily expenditures in Pittsburgh. The plaintiffs pre-
pared expense reports. However, they had received erroneous initial
instructions for reporting maid tips. Management advised plaintiffs
that their expense reports did not comply with company policy and
told them to make corrections.1 14 After correcting the reports, plain-
tiffs were told to change their reports again, to lower their expenses by
approximately $200.15 In late November, management sent the
plaintiffs written guidelines for completing expense reports.
Although these guidelines conflicted with the instructions plaintiffs
received before leaving St. Paul, the company requested additional
changes in line with the guidelines. The plaintiffs refused to make
further changes because the expenses on the original reports were
incurred honestly and reported in line with the instructions they had
been given. While the company did not dispute the honesty of the
reports, management once again requested further revisions in Janu-
ary 1981. At this time, the office manager provided plaintiffs with yet
another, and different, set of guidelines. In addition, three of the
plaintiffs met individually with a manager who again demanded that
they change their expense reports to comply with company policies.
When they refused, they were put on probation and warned-for the
first time-of possible termination. A week later, plaintiffs again were
asked to refund money to the company. When they insisted upon
112 IRL at 880.
113 The company had written guidelines concerning travel, but no one reviewed
the guidelines with the plaintiffs prior to their trip. The plaintiffs received no written
instructions. They were not told that the company required expense reports, but they
were told about daily allowances and were advised to keep receipts for hotel bills and
airfare. They were given a $1400 travel advance, "which, having no instruction to the
contrary, they spent in full." Id. at 880-81.
114 Id.
115 Since plaintiffs had already spent their travel advances in full, the company was
seeking reimbursement from each plaintiff's personal funds. Id.
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standing by their reports, they were fired for "gross
insubordination."11
6
The company stood firm in its decision to terminate the plain-
tiffs, notwithstanding that plaintiffs' performance had been "at all
times satisfactory and even commendable," 17 and management fur-
ther conceded that the expense report problems could have been
avoided had the plaintiffs received adequate guidance before their de-
parture.11 8 To make matters worse, because the proffered reason for
termination was "gross insubordination," company policy precluded
plaintiffs from receiving severance pay.' 19
After leaving Equitable, plaintiffs sought new jobs. When pro-
spective employers asked them to explain why they had been termi-
nated, each stated she was fired for "gross insubordination." Plaintiffs
sued Equitable for breach of contract and defamation, basing their
defamation claim on their repetition of the reason for termination to
prospective employers.1 20
Relying on Colonial Stores v. Barrett,'21 Grist v. Upjohn Co.,12 2 and
McKinney v. County of Santa Clara,123 the Minnesota Supreme Court
recognized the defamation cause of action based on compelled self-
publication "where the plaintiff was compelled to publish a defama-
tory statement to a third person if it was foreseeable to the defendant
that the plaintiff would be so compelled."' 24 Agreeing with the Mc-
Kinney reasoning, the court emphasized "the 'strong causal link' be-
tween the defendant's actions and the damage caused by the
republication"' 25 as the rationale for imposing liability. The court re-
jected Equitable's arguments that permitting the defamation claim
116 Id. at 881.
117 Id. at 882.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Each plaintiff had difficulty finding a new job after being fired by Equitable.
Of the four plaintiffs, only one was hired by a new employer when she explained the
reasons for her termination. One plaintiff was unable to find full-time employment
after leaving Equitable. Two of the plaintiffs resorted to a strategy of evasiveness to
obtain newjobs. One misrepresented on ajob application form the reason for leaving
Equitable and then explained the true reason in her interview, while another plaintiff
was hired only when she left blank an application form question about reasons for
leaving her previous employment, and the subject was not raised in her interview. Id.
at 881.
121 38 S.E.2d 306 (Ga. Ct. App. 1946); see supra text accompanying notes 77-98.
122 168 N.W.2d 289 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969); see supra text accompanying note 106.
123 168 Cal. Rptr. 89 (Ct. App. 1980); see supra text accompanying notes 100-09.
124 Lewis, 380 N.W.2d at 888.
125 Id. at 887.
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imposed tort liability for wrongful discharge, contrary to Minnesota
law, and that recognition of self-publication claims would discourage
plaintiffs from mitigating damages.
Regarding the first argument, the court reasoned that the defa-
mation claim was independent of a tort claim for wrongful discharge.
Also, Minnesota law did not foreclose the possibility of tort recovery
for "bad-faith termination of a contract,"' 26 which, by implication,
would describe Equitable's conduct toward the plaintiffs. Responding
to the mitigation argument, the court reasoned that limiting the doc-
trine to cases of foreseeable compulsion minimized any problems of
mitigation. The duty to mitigate could be met by requiring plaintiffs
to take "all reasonable steps"' 27 to explain and contradict the defama-
tory statement. The court acknowledged the significance of relaxing
the publication requirement and called for caution in applying the
new doctrine. However, the court viewed the compulsion require-
ment as a significant limitation on what might otherwise be an expan-
sive 128 basis for employer liability:
[When properly applied, it need not substantially broaden the
scope of liability for defamation. The concept of compelled self-
publication does no more than hold the originator of the defama-
tory statement liable for damages caused by the statement where the
originator knows, or should know, of circumstances whereby the de-
famed person has no reasonable means of avoiding publication of
the statement or avoiding the resulting damages; in other words, in
cases where the defamed person was compelled to publish the state-
ment. In such circumstances, the damages are fairly viewed as the
direct result of the originator's actions.
Properly applied, the doctrine of compelled self-publication
does not unduly burden the free communication of views or unrea-
sonably broaden the scope of defamation liability.' 29
The court acknowledged concerns that employers would respond
by refraining from informing employees of reasons for discharge.
However, the majority viewed the doctrine as sufficiently limited in
other important aspects designed to address those concerns. First, the
court held that the qualified privilege' 30 applied to self-publication
defamation actions. Addressing concern that employers would face
potential liability each time they informed employees of reasons for
discharge, the court viewed the qualified privilege as a safe harbor for
126 Id.
127 Id. at 888.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 See supra discussion at Part II.B.2.
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employers, limiting liability to cases where plaintiffs proved the em-
ployer abused the privilege. Recognition of the privilege, the court
reasoned, would ensure employers would continue to inform employ-
ees of reasons for discharge.
13'
Second, the court sought to safeguard employers' communica-
tion of information by disallowing punitive damages in defamation ac-
tions based on self-publication. The court reasoned that punitive
damages, if available, would encourage employees to publish defama-
tory statements and would deter employer communication of reasons
for termination. The court therefore concluded that permitting puni-
tive damages in self-publication claims would be contrary to the public
interest.13
2
Once again, egregious employer conduct paved the way for judi-
cial recognition of an employee's self-publication defamation claim.
Like the employer in Colonial Stores v. Barrett, Equitable discharged the
plaintiffs in an unfair and unreasonable manner, with an unjustified
characterization of the reasons for discharge. Equitable's managers
conceded that management error caused the misunderstandings
about the expense reports. Elements of overreaching also were pres-
ent. Equitable, a large corporation, continued to press the claims rep-
resentatives to pay, from their personal funds, money owed to the
company as a result of a mistake by Equitable's managers. Finally,
Equitable did not exercise its probation policy in good faith. Instead,
the company used the probationary period to set up the employees
for discharge rather than giving them an opportunity for rehabilita-
tion. The court agreed with the jury that Equitable had acted with ill
will toward the plaintiffs; the judges also indicated that Equitable's
conduct could be viewed as "bad-faith termination of a contract"
which would be an appropriate basis for tort recovery.
1 33
"'Hard cases make bad law,"' 13 4 Justice Kelley responded in a
strong dissent. Examining Equitable's conduct in the case, he stated:
An oft repeated aphorism in the law is that "hard cases make bad
law." This is such a case. The conduct of the superiors ... was, on
the whole, despicable. Fortunately, such egregious conduct by
superiors towards employees in these days is rare, but when present
it is understandable why juries and judges sometimes are tempted to
131 Lewis, 380 N.W.2d at 889. However, the qualified privilege was defeated in
Lewis because the jury found that the company acted with actual malice. Id.
132 Id. at 892.
133 Id. at 887.
134 Id. at 895 (citation omitted).
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extend judicial rules to afford those victims vindication and
compensation.13
5
Concerned about how the new rule extended liability, Justice Kel-
ley questioned whether the majority's requirements of compulsion
and foreseeable republication sufficiently limited the scope of defama-
tion exposure. In his view, foreseeable compulsion to repeat the em-
ployer's statement would always be present when terminated
employees sought newjobs. He criticized the new doctrine as an un-
reasonable broadening of defamation liability which would force em-
ployers to refrain from informing employees of justifications for
termination decisions.'
36
Two years later, the Colorado Supreme Court adopted the doc-
trine of compelled self-publication in Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co.
137
Coors fired Diana Churchey, an hourly employee in the Coors glass
plant, for "dishonesty."'13 8 During her seven years of employment at
Coors, Churchey had a satisfactory work record and no prior history
of discipline. However, a five-day absence from work and a series of
misunderstandings about medical clearances led to her dismissal.
Churchey developed conjunctivitis, an eye infection, over a week-
end. After seeing her physician, she called her supervisor on Sunday
to advise him that she would need to miss work on Monday, January
17. After seeing a specialist on Monday, she requested a leave of ab-
sence. Her supervisor told her to first report to the Coors medical
center. On Tuesday, a Coors nurse practitioner confirmed the diag-
nosis and ordered Churchey to return to work on the following day.
However, Churchey's condition worsened overnight. After an exami-
nation on Wednesday, January 19, Churchey's doctors diagnosed sinu-
sitis in addition to the conjunctivitis. They advised her not to return
to work until the following Monday.1 3 9
Churchey called her supervisor on Wednesday, asking to be ex-
cused from work. Because he was not familiar with Coors's leave pol-
icy, the supervisor decided to call Churchey back in the afternoon.
When he called her, he told her to go to the Coors medical center. It
was not clear what time he called or if there was sufficient time for




136 Id. at 896.
137 759 P.2d 1336 (Colo. 1988).
138 Id. at 1338.
139 Id- at 1338-39.
140 Id-
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In any event, Churchey reported to Coors on the following day,
Thursday, January 20. She gave her supervisor a release form signed
by the Coors nurse practitioner on Tuesday. The form, which had
been prepared before Churchey's condition had worsened, directed
Churchey to return to work on Wednesday. The supervisor did not
read the form when Churchey gave it to him.
14'
After meeting with her supervisor on Thursday morning,
Churchey reported to the Coors medical center. The nurse practi-
tioner scheduled her to see the Coors physician on Friday and ex-
cused her from work until then. Churchey returned home. On
Thursday afternoon, her supervisor read the release form which
Churchey had given him earlier. Noting that the release ordered her
to return to work on Wednesday, the supervisor met with a Coors per-
sonnel specialist. After consulting with personnel staff, the supervisor
decided to suspend Churchey's pay since she was not at work as the
form had directed. No one notified Churchey about the
suspension.142
Churchey saw the Coors physician on the following day, Friday,
January 21. The physician signed a medical treatment form which the
supervisor had dated January 24. Churchey returned home, mistak-
enly believing that the form authorized her to be absent until Tues-
day, January 25. It was a costly mistake. The physician spoke with her
supervisor, who told the physician that Churchey had been scheduled
to work on Friday. The physician stated that Churchey had told him
she was not scheduled to work until the following Tuesday. Based on
this conversation, management decided to suspend Churchey if she
did not report for work by 3:30 p.m. on Friday. Once again, no one
informed Churchey of the decision.'
43
When Churchey returned to work on Tuesday, January 25, her
supervisors advised her that she was suspended.'4 She was fired the
next day for "dishonesty" on the grounds that she had "failed and
refused to report her medical clearances to return to work forJanuary
19 and 21."1
45
Churchey sued Coors for defamation, 146 relying on the theory of
self-publication. Churchey's complaint alleged that she "'ha[d] been
forced to repeat the reason for her discharge to prospective employ-




145 Id. at 1338.
146 Churchey's lawsuit also included causes of action for wrongful discharge and
outrageous conduct. Id. With regard to the outrageous conduct claim, the court af-
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ers to her damage and detriment, an event that was or should have
been foreseeable by the Defendant and [was], accordingly, attributa-
ble to the Defendant.'1 47 The trial court accepted Churchey's theory
of self-publication, finding that the situation fit within the exceptions
described in comments k and m to section 577 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts.148 However, the trial court granted summary judgment
in favor of Coors, finding no indication that Coors "knew or should
have foreseen the likelihood of publication by [Churcheyl of the rea-
sons for termination at the time it communicated those reasons to
her."1 49 The Colorado Court of Appeals rejected the theory of fore-
seeable publication. It affirmed the grant of summary judgment, con-
cluding "there had been no unprivileged communication of the
grounds for Churchey's termination to anyone other than herself."' 50
Churchey appealed the case to the Colorado Supreme Court.
Noting that defamation by self-publication was a case of first impres-
sion in Colorado, the court looked to decisions in other jurisdictions.
The court observed that other states had recognized two versions of
self-publication: "The first approach imposes liability if the defendant
knew or could have foreseen that the plaintiff would be compelled to
repeat the defamatory statement; the second imposes liability if the de-
fendant knew or could have foreseen that the plaintiff was likely to re-
peat the statement." ' 5'
The court rejected the "likely repetition" standard. Instead, it
adopted the "foreseeable compulsion" standard. Like the Lewis and
McKinney courts, the Colorado court concluded that "the strong
causal link between the actions of the originator and the damage
caused by the republication" justified imposing liability on employers
in cases of employee self-publication. 52 The causal link existed be-
cause an employer would know of the circumstances creating the
strong compulsion at the time the defamatory statement was commu-
nicated to the employee.
The court also found practical reasons for adopting the compul-
sion standard rather than the standard based on mere foreseeability
of self-publication. The court reasoned that the more stringent stan-
dard would limit liability. It would prevent recovery in cases of "volun-
firmed the trial court's grant of summaryjudgment. The court remanded the wrong-
ful discharge and defamation claims for further proceedings. Id. at 1351.
147 Id. at 1343.
148 See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
149 Churchey, 759 P.2d at 1343.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 1344 (emphasis added).
152 Id.
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tary self-publication," where the plaintiff could avoid damage by
declining to repeat the statement.1 53 In addition, a compulsion stan-
dard-in contrast to a standard based on foreseeability alone-would
not unnecessarily deter open communication about workplace
problems. 54 Thus, the Colorado court aligned itself with Lewis and
McKinney, recognizing a defamation cause of action in the case of
compelled self-publication.
The court's analysis of the facts also is significant. While the
court did not explicitly conclude that Coors's conduct was unreasona-
ble, the court raised pointed questions about the manner in which
Coors handled Churchey's situation. First, it appeared that Coors's
policy and procedures regarding medical releases lacked clarity. Sec-
ond, Churchey received confusing instructions. Third, at least some
portion of the misunderstandings seemed attributable to sloppy pro-
cedures and failures on the part of Coors's medical and management
personnel, such as the supervisor's failure to read the release form,
failure to notify Churchey that she had been suspended, and other
communication lapses. Fourth, Coors suspended Churchey without
advising her of the situation and without giving her an opportunity to
cure the perceived misconduct. In fact, Churchey did not learn she
had been suspended the previous week until the day before she was
discharged. Finally, the court questioned Coors's characterization of
Churchey's conduct, noting that "the evidence regarding each inci-
dent is susceptible of reasonable interpretations other than
dishonesty.'
55
The court's opinion evidences an underlying concern that Coors
had been unfair and unduly harsh in its treatment of Churchey. In-
deed, Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co. shares factual similarities with its
predecessors, Lewis and Colonial Stores. Churchey represents a variation
on familiar themes: questionable characterization of an employee's
conduct; a misunderstanding that seems at least partially attributable
to errors by supervisors and management; and the application of the
harsh sanction of termination. Like Lewis and Colonial Stores, Churchey
is a "hard case" where a new legal standard evolves from egregious
facts. Each case shares similar elements of overreaching and unfair-
ness, as long-term employees with satisfactory or better service records
and no prior history of discipline were terminated for reasons that are
at best questionable, and at worst, not supported by the facts.
153 Id. at 1345.
154 Id.
155 Id at 1341.
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While McKinney, Lewis, and Churchey focused on the strong causal
link and the concept that the defamed person's publication must be
compelled, a somewhat broader test emerged in other jurisdictions. As
noted by the court in Churchey, this less stringent standard does not
require the plaintiffs publication to be compelled. Instead, it is suffi-
cient in those jurisdictions that "the utterer of the defamatory matter
intends, or has reason to suppose, that in the ordinary course of
events the matter will come to the knowledge of some third per-
son."156 A Texas case, First State Bank of Corpus Christi v. Ake,
157 is
illustrative.
Plaintiff Ake was a former bank president who allegedly was li-
beled by statements contained in a fidelity bond proof of loss form
that the bank sent to its insurance carrier. The bond form described
losses in the amount of $41,456.05 from unauthorized loans and
checks held without authorization. The chairperson of the bank's
board of directors blamed Ake for the losses. In a signed, notarized
statement, the chairperson declared: "I hereby certify that the above
statement is true and correct in every respect; that this company sus-
tained a loss in the amount above stated through the dishonesty of Arthur E.
Ake employed as president .... ."158 Although Ake initially used the board
chairperson as a reference, there was no evidence that anyone other
than Ake had communicated the contents of the bond claim to pro-
spective employers. 159 Not surprisingly, Ake had difficulty finding
subsequent employment, and there was evidence that one bank re-
jected him as a candidate for bank president because of the bond
claim. 160 The bank argued it was not liable because Ake had volunta-
rily disclosed the filing of the bond claim and thus caused his own
156 Neighbors v. Kirksville College of Osteopathic Med., 694 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1985); see also Heberholt v. DePaul Community Health Ctr., 625 S.W.2d 617
(Mo. 1982) (cause of action recognized, but plaintiff failed to overcome defendant's
qualified privilege).
157 606 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
158 Id. at 699 (emphasis added). The fidelity bond claim ultimately was denied.
Perhaps the bank should have based the termination on a different transaction. Ake
actually had illegally hypothecated his bank stock, but the fidelity bond claim in ques-
tion related to other transactions.
159 Id. at 703.
160 Id. After his termination, Ake applied for and was rejected for a number of
banking positions. More than a year passed before he obtained employment with
another bank as a loan officer, a position which paid substantially less than bank presi-
dent. Interestingly, Ake lost this job after five years because he maintained "an im-
proper business relationship with a customer." He did not find another banking job.
At the time of the trial, he was working as a car salesman. Id. at 699.
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damages. 161 Ake countered that he felt obligated to inform prospec-
tive employers about the claim.' 62
The court recognized the general rule of non-liability where the
defamed person publishes the statements, but it also noted the rule
was subject to exceptions, as illustrated in comments to section 577 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The court considered comment m,
which provided an exception to the general rule where "the circum-
stances indicated that communication to a third party is likely."
1 63 It
also considered comment k to section 577 which permitted an action
for self-published defamation in the context of negligent communica-
tions-where the originator's conduct created an unreasonable risk
that the defamatory matter would be communicated to a third
party.164 The court apparently found both exceptions applicable, not-
ing that it would be natural in a banking industry interview or employ-
ment application for a prospective employer to ask a banker whether
a fidelity bond claim had ever been filed against him. 65 Accordingly,
the court affirmed the jury verdict in favor of Ake. However, unlike
the court in McKinney, the court did not require a showing of strong
compulsion. Likelihood of disclosure to a third party sufficed. 66
Examination of the facts of Ake reveals another case where egre-
gious employer conduct begets a successful self-publication claim.
When the board chairperson testified about the fidelity bond claim,
he conceded there was no evidence that Ake had been guilty of dis-
161 Id. at 701.
162 Id. at 703.
163 Id. at 701.
164 Id. Regarding negligent publications, the court stated: "Likewise, if a reason-
able person would recognize that an act creates an unreasonable risk that the defama-
tory matter will be communicated to a third party, the conduct becomes a negligent
communication, which amounts to a publication just as effectively as an intentional
communication." Id.
165 Id. at 701-02.
166 Five years later, another Texas appellate court relied on Ake to uphold a defa-
mation verdict based on foreseeable self-publication. Chasewood Constr. Co. v. Rico, 696
S.W.2d 439 (Tex. App. 1985), arose out of the termination of construction subcon-
tracts. Rico, a subcontractor, was accused of misappropriating materials from the
general contractor. Consequently, the general contractor ordered Rico to remove his
equipment and workers from the job site immediately. Rico premised the defamation
claim on having to explain the abrupt departure by telling his workers he had been
accused of stealing and was ordered to leave. The court found Rico's explanation was
reasonable and concluded that the general contractor should have known that Rico
would communicate the accusation to his employees. Id. at 444.
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honesty in bank transactions. 67 Notwithstanding the lack of evidence
of dishonesty, the bank stood behind the libelous statements in the
fidelity bond claim, knowing the existence of the claim would impede
Ake's ability to find subsequent employment' 68
Ake parallels Colonial Stores, Lewis and Churchey with regard to em-
ployer conduct and the employee's remedy. The employer terminated
an at-will employee under questionable circumstances. As an at-will
employee, Ake had limited recourse; without a defamation claim he
would have had no remedy. The self-publication claim thus func-
tioned as a gap-filler, creating a cause of action that could have been
summarily dismissed under traditional defamation doctrine. 169
Foreseeable self-publication defamation served a similar purpose
in a Missouri case, Neighbors v. Kirksville College of Osteopathic
Medicine.'70 The college terminated Donna Neighbors and issued a
service letter at her request. 71 The service letter explained that
Neighbors had been terminated "because the College had reasonable
cause to believe that she had breached the confidentiality of a patient
at the clinic."172 Neighbors, who was an at-will employee, brought an
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, 73 libel, breach of
167 Ake 606 S.W.2d at 700. The bank ultimately withdrew a portion of the claim,
the insurance company denied the balance, and the bank did not pursue the claim
further. Id.
168 The board chairperson admitted he would not hire a candidate for bank presi-
dent who had a fidelity bond claim filed against him. Id. at 703.
169 But see Doe v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 855 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. App. 1993),
affd on other grounds, 903 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1995), where another division of the Texas
appellate court declined to adopt the doctrine of compelled self-publication. Noting
that the Texas Supreme Court "has yet to adopt the view that publication may occur
by 'self-defamation,"' the Doe court reaffirmed the traditional publication require-
ment. The court criticized Ake, contending that the Ake decision rested on an inaccu-
rate analysis of section 577, comment m of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Id. at 259.
The appeal of Doe did not address the issue of compelled self-publication. See infra
text accompanying notes 219-20.
170 694 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). Neighbors followed the foreseeable self-
publication approach which had been adopted by the Missouri Supreme Court in
Herberholt v. DePaul Community Health Center, 625 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1982), superseded &y
statute on other grounds, Mo. REv. STAT. § 290.140 (West 1993).
171 State law required the employer, upon request of a terminated employee, to
provide a signed letter "setting forth the nature and character of service rendered by
such employee to such corporation and the duration thereof, and truly stating for
what cause, if any, such employee was discharged or voluntarily quit such service."
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 290.140 (West 1993).
172 Neighbors, 694 S.W.2d at 823.
173 Id. at 822.
Neighbors alleged that the College caused her emotional distress by stating
untrue grounds for her termination in the service letter. Neighbors con-
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the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 174 and tortious
wrongful discharge. 175 The court rejected the emotional distress, im-
plied covenant and tortious wrongful discharge claims as efforts to cir-
cumvent the employment at will rule. However, the court reversed
the lower court's judgment dismissing the libel claim. Because Neigh-
bors had alleged the service letter was given to her as a reference and
was read by prospective employers, the court permitted the libel claim
to proceed on a theory of self-publication.
Although the letter was sent to Neighbors, her allegation is that the
defendants knew that the purpose of the letter could only be served
if it were shown to prospective employers, and that in fact it was
shown to such persons. The petition sufficiently pleaded that the
defendants had reason to know that in the ordinary course of events
the letter would be read by third parties. The petition thus alleged
the exception to the general rule concerning publication. 176
Neighbors provides a striking illustration of a court using the self-
publication claim to fill a void in the law. For the most part, the court
adheres vigorously to the at-will rule and decries attempts to circum-
vent it with causes of action for tortious discharge, and breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and emotional dis-
tress. 177 Because the tortious discharge and implied covenant claims
would recognize plaintiff as having rights in continued employment,
the court expresses justifiable concern about circumventing the at-will
rule. It is less clear why the emotional distress claim also circumvents
the at-will rule if the defamation claim does not do so. Yet the court
permits the defamation claim to proceed without discussing whether
the claim circumvents the at will rule and offers no explanation for
treating the defamation claim differently from the emotional distress
claim. The case seems based on an unspoken solicitude of reputation
rights as opposed to job security or freedom from mental distress. In
any event, by permitting the defamation claim to go forward based on
self-publication, the court provides a remedy to an at-will employee
whose claim would have been otherwise dismissed.
With the exception of Neighbors, the workplace self-publication
doctrine developed in cases of egregious employer conduct. In some
tends that the receipt of this letter, which she alleges state a false reason for
her termination, and which accused her of breaching a patient's confidenti-
ality, caused her to suffer emotional distress and mental injury.
Id.
174 Id. at 824.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 825.
177 Id. at 824.
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cases, the defamation claim substituted for tort wrongful termination
claims which were not cognizable under applicable state law' 78 and
expanded the remedies that were available to the aggrieved employ-
ees. However, this expansion was not always welcome. Shortly after
the Lewis and Churchey decisions, the Minnesota and Colorado legisla-
tures enacted statutes in response to the emerging doctrine.
2. Legislative Responses to the Compelled Self-Publication Cases
a. Minnesota
The decision in Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United
States sparked controversy and comment. Writers in the popular press
and business press joined legal scholars in examining, critiquing or
celebrating the Minnesota court's decision. 179 In addition, the case
garnered the attention of the Minnesota legislature. In a swift re-
sponse to the Lewis decision, the legislature in 1987 enacted a statute
which limits compelled self-publication but does not abolish the cause
of action. The statute requires employers to provide a written, truth-
ful explanation to a terminated employee at the employee's request.
Compliance with the statute's notice requirement immunizes the em-
ployer from a defamation claim based on communication of the em-
ployer's written statement of "the truthful reason for the termination."
The statute provides:
178 See Larson, supra note 6, at 48 (noting criticism that compelled self-publication
defamation is "a thinly-disguised and ill-founded substitute for the tort of wrongful
discharge" and that compelled self-publication claims are "being misused in an at-
tempt to protect employees from termination for improper or maliciously motivated
reasons"); Mastry, supra note 9, at 1098 (self-publication defamation serves as a "useful
alternative for alleviating the effects of at-will employment"); Posey, supra note 58, at
475 (describing defamation claims as "a back door approach in states that do not
recognize a wrongful discharge tort" (quoting Nancy Blodgett, New Twist to Defamation
Suits: Company Held Liable for Self-Publication, A.B.A. J., May 1, 1987, at 17)). But see
Langvardt, supra note 3, at 273-74 (Essence of defamation claim is to protect against
reputational loss rather than loss of employment. Thus, "[t ] he allowance of damages
on the discharged employee's defamation claim does not amount to a surreptitious
allowance of the equivalent of a wrongful discharge action, even though the defama-
tion claim stems from an employment termination setting .... Properly viewed, the
compelled self-publication doctrine is a logical development that does not go so far as
to transform a defamation action into a wrongful discharge substitute.").
179 See, e.g., Mastry, supra note 9; Blodgett, supra note 9, at 17; RichardJ. Reibstein,
Employee Defamation: A New Theory, N.Y. LJ., Dec. 27, 1989, at 1; Stricharchuk, supra
note 2, at 33; Austin C. Wehrwein, Fired Employees'Release of Own Data Ruled Defamatory,
NAT'L L.J., Feb. 11, 1985, at 6 (discussing the decision of the Minnesota Court of
Appeals in Lewis).
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181.933 Notice of termination
Subdivision 1. Notice required. An employee who has been
involuntarily terminated may, within five working days following
such termination, request in writing that the employer inform the
employee of the reason for the termination. Within five working
days following receipt of such request, an employer shall inform the
terminated employee in writing of the truthful reason for the
termination.
Subdivision 2. Defamation action prohibited. No communica-
tion of the statement furnished by the employer to the employee
under subdivision 1 may be made the subject of any action for libel,
slander, or defamation by the employee against the employer.18 0
Subdivision 1 requires written disclosure of "the truthful reason
for the termination" if the employee requests an explanation; subdivi-
sion 2 precludes defamation claims where an employer has complied
with subdivision 1 by providing a written statement of the truthful rea-
son for termination. The statute apparently attempts to address the
majority and dissenting justices' concerns in Lewis that fear of liability
would discourage employers from communicating reasons for termi-
nation. By requiring written disclosure and prohibiting defamation
actions based on truthful disclosure, the statute may increase the like-
lihood that employers will communicate the reasons for termina-
tion-if they are asked.
With the enactment of the statute, the Minnesota legislature
chose to curtail the self-publication claim rather than to eliminate it.
However, section 181.933 encourages communication under a rather
narrowly prescribed set of circumstances; compelled self-publication
actions are prohibited only if the statement was "furnished by the em-
ployer to the employee under subdivision 1."181 Consequently, the stat-
ute leaves open a number of avenues for compelled self-publication
defamation claims based on any combination of oral communications
regarding termination or failure of the employee, employer, or both,
to meet the statutory timing requirements.
For example, in LeBaron v. Minnesota Board of Public Defense, 182 the
court held that section 181.933 did not bar a defamation claim where
the employer and employee failed to follow the timing requirements
of the statute. Although the defamation claim in LeBaron was not
180 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.933 (West 1994).
181 Id.; cf. Marshall H. Tanick, New Directions in Minnesota Defamation Law, 59 HEN-
NEPIN LAW 2, 19 (1989).
182 499 N.W.2d 39 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
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based on compelled self-publication, 83 the case demonstrates that the
statute's protections are not available where the parties have not com-
plied with the statute. LeBaron provides one example of noncompli-
ance. It is likely a compelled self-publication defamation claim would
be permitted in any other situation that failed to meet the letter of the
statute.'
84
Ultimately, the Minnesota statute fails to curtail litigation or pro-
vide employers with effective protection from self-publication defama-
tion claims. Rather than reducing litigation, the statute may instead
provide additional reasons to litigate self-publication defamation
claims in Minnesota.18 5 Moreover, the statute, which prohibits defa-
mation claims based on statements "under subdivision 1," which re-
quires the communication to be the "truthful reason" for termination,
does little to reduce claims as a practical matter. Existing law already
provides that truth is a complete defense to a defamation claim.' 8 6 In
addition, truth is usually a question of fact to be determined by the
jury.18 7 Unless the facts regarding truth are undisputed, expensive lit-
igation will be required to resolve truth issues under the statute as well
as the common law. Thus, as a practical matter, the Minnesota statute
does little to clarify the law, and it fails to live up to any promise of
curbing workplace self-publication claims.
183 The employee, a public defender, was terminated in June. In July, he pro-
tested the firing in a letter to the State Public Defender. When the State Public De-
fender requested the employer to provide its view of the termination, the employer
wrote a letter stating the employee had been terminated for unexcused absences,
sexual harassment, failure to carry his share of the workload, failure to "fairly repre-
sent" his caseload, submission of false time reports, and submission of a fraudulent
expense reimbursement claim. The employer's letter, sent on July 23, formed the
basis of the employee's defamation claim. Id. at 40.
184 Consider the following scenarios that would not be covered by the statute: (1)
an employee orally requests her employer to provide reasons for termination; (2) an
employee makes a written request for reasons for termination, but the request is
made later than five working days following the termination; (3) an employer pro-
vides a written explanation of reasons for termination to an employee who did not
request such information; and (4) an employer provides an informal, oral statement
of reasons for termination to an employee who did not request such information.
This is not an exhaustive list. Based on the wording of the statute, other scenarios
that do not fall within the parameters of subdivision 1 also could give rise to self-
publication defamation claims.
185 See Tanick, supra note 181, at 19.
186 See supra discussion at Part II.B.1.
187 See supra text accompanying note 57.
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b. Colorado
In contrast to Minnesota, the Colorado legislature has eliminated
the compelled self-publication cause of action. After Churchey, the
Colorado legislature amended the state's statutory provisions concern-
ing libel and slander. 88 The amended statute makes it clear that an
actionable publication is a communication to someone other than the
plaintiff. Moreover, the statute expressly prohibits self-publication
claims. The statute provides:
§ 13-25-125.5 Libel and slander-self-publication
No action for libel or slander may be brought or maintained
unless the party charged with such defamation has published, either
orally or in writing, the defamatory statement to a person other than
the person making the allegation of libel or slander. Self-publication, either
orally or in writing, of the defamatory statement to a third person by
the person making such allegation shall not give rise to a claim for libel
or slander against the person who originally communicated the defamatory
statement. 1 89
Unlike its Minnesota counterpart, the Colorado legislature left
no room for defamation claims based on self-publication under any
circumstances. Whether based on oral or written statements, whether
republication is foreseeable or not, a workplace defamation claim in
Colorado requires publication by the employer to a third person. Col-
orado employers can give reasons for termination in confidence with-
out concern about liability based on the employee's repetition. This
bright-line rule is a victory for employers and encourages uninhibited
flow of workplace information.
At the same time, precluding all defamation actions based on
compelled self-publication leaves an at-will employee in Ms.
Churchey's situation-where the employer's characterization of the
discharge is unreasonable or misleading-without recourse. 190 If the
employee subsequently must reveal the reason for discharge to a pro-
spective employer and is not hired because of the disclosure, the em-
ployee has no cause of action. While the statute encourages the flow
of information, it fails to balance the rights of employees in "hard
cases" and leaves potentially deserving plaintiffs without a remedy.
188 Section 13-25-125.5 became effective April 8, 1989. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
25-125.5 (West Supp. 1996).
189 Id. (emphasis added).
190 Colorado courts generally have not recognized breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing as an exception to the at-will rule. Pittman v. Larson
Distrib. Co., 724 P.2d 1379, 1385-86 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986); Farmer v. Central
Bancorp, 761 P.2d 220, 221-22 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
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Among the jurisdictions that have considered compelled self-pub-
lication cases, only Colorado and Minnesota have responded with leg-
islation. Outside of these two states, the doctrine primarily has been a
matter ofjudicial concern. Courts have responded to the doctrine in
a variety of ways.
3. Beyond Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society
of the United States- Trends in the Courts
While Lewis remains the leading case in favor of compelled self-
publication, Lewis has not been universally embraced. Courts outside
of Minnesota have given the doctrine a mixed reception. For some
courts, compelled self-publication is part of a growing trend in defa-
mation law.' 91 Other courts have refused to embrace the doctrine
and do not see a trend in favor of compelled self-publication. 192 Even
in jurisdictions that have accepted the doctrine, courts have taken di-
vergent paths in developing the compelled self-publication .tort.
Some courts continue to apply and refine the doctrine. 193 Others are
rethinking the doctrine and limiting its application, 94 distinguishing
191 See, e.g., Weldy v. Piedmont Airlines, No. CIV-88-6283, 1989 WL 158342, at *6
(W.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1989) ("The direction of modem authority is plainly toward the
recognition of a claim for compelled self-defamation."), affd, 1991 WL 5147
(W.D.N.Y.Jan. 15, 1991), rev'd mem., 1992 WL 73175 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1992) (plain-
tiff failed to meet burden of proof on slander and "compelled self-defamation"
claims), rev'd on other grounds, 985 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1993) (slander claim); Elmore v.
Shell Oil Co., 733 F. Supp. 544, 546 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (observing that "[a]lthough New
York courts have not addressed the issue, there appears to be a growing trend in other
jurisdictions" to recognize a claim for compelled self-publication); Mandelblatt v. Per-
elman, 683 F. Supp. 379, 386 (S.D.N.Y 1988) (noting that the self-publication doc-
trine is "the law in a growing minority of American jurisdictions"). But see Starr v.
Pearle Vision, Inc., 54 F.3d 1548, 1554 (10th Cir. 1995) ("'the vast majority of states
considering [compelled self-publication] reject it"' (quoting Hensley v. Armstrong
World Indus. Inc., 798 F. Supp. 653, 657 (W.D. Okla. 1992))); De Leon v. St.Joseph
Hosp., Inc., 871 F.2d 1229, 1237 (4th Cir. 1989) ("The theory of self-publication has
not gained widespread acceptance .... "); Layne v. Builders Plumbing Supply Co., 569
N.E.2d 1104, 1110 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) ("Thus far, the tort of compelled self-defama-
tion has not gained widespread acceptance ....").
192 See, e.g., Gore v. Health-Tex, Inc., 567 So. 2d 1307 (Ala. 1990); Layne, 569
N.E.2d at 1110; Wieder v. Chemical Bank, 608 N.Y.S.2d 195 (App. Div. 1994); Yetter v.
Ward Trucking Corp., 585 A.2d 1022 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
193 See, e.g., Steinbach v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 728 F. Supp. 1389 (D.
Minn. 1989) (self-publication elements satisfied; allegations of actual malice created a
jury issue on qualified privilege); Alstad v. Office Depot, No. C-94-1400 DLG, 1995 WL
84452 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 1995); Davis v. Consolidated Freightways, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d
438 (Ct. App. 1994).
194 See, e.g., Green v. Sun Trust Banks, Inc., 399 S.E.2d 712 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
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new cases from cases which permitted self-publication claims, 195 or
questioning the reasoning of previous decisions adopting the
doctrine.1 9 6
Georgia courts began to limit compelled self-publication even
prior to Lewis. Having adopted the doctrine in Colonial Stores, Inc. v.
Barrett,197 subsequent cases have distinguished Colonial Stores, empha-
sizing that the plaintiff in that case was compelled to publish defama-
tory statements because regulations required him to provide the
statement to prospective employers. More recently, plaintiffs asserting
compelled self-publication claims in Georgia have not prevailed be-
cause no laws required the employees to disclose reasons for
termination.
For example, consider the case of Brantley v. Heller' 98 In Brantley,
the plaintiff based his defamation claim on statements in a separation
notice prepared pursuant to the Georgia Employment Security
Law.199 The law required employers to submit a form giving the "full
facts and reasons for separation" 200 to the Georgia Employment Se-
curity Agency and to provide a copy of the form to the employee.
Unfortunately for the plaintiff, the Employment Security Law did not
require him to give the separation notice to prospective employers.
Consequently, the court concluded his publication was voluntary and
expressly distinguished the case from Colonial Stores.20 ' Similarly, in
Sigmon v. Womack,202 plaintiff could not base a claim on giving reasons
for termination in an employment application. Comparing Sigmon's
claim to the claim in Colonial Stores, the court concluded that "Sigmon
libeled herself by her own voluntary action."20 3 The court also re-
jected plaintiff's claim in Green v. Sun Trust Banks, Inc.20 4 on the
grounds that the self-publication was voluntary. Without discussing
the circumstances of the alleged compelled self-publications, the
195 See, e.g., Brantley v. Heller, 112 S.E.2d 685 (Ga. Ct. App. 1960) (no defamation
claim based on self-publication where plaintiff, unlike employee in Colonial Stores, was
not required by law to show separation notice to prospective employers).
196 See, e.g., Doe v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 855 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. App. 1993),
affd on other grounds, 903 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1995).
197 38 S.E.2d 306 (Ga. Ct. App. 1946).
198 112 S.E.2d 685 (Ga. Ct. App. 1960).
199 Id. at 688.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 689.
202 279 S.E.2d 254 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981).
203 Id. at 257.
204 399 S.E.2d 712 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
[VOL- 72:2
BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD CASE
Green court concluded that "[a] 11 plaintiffs have shown is purely volun-
tary self-publication, and Colonial Stores is of no assistance to them."205
By emphasizing a legal obligation to disclose as key to a com-
pelled self-publication claim, the Georgia Court of Appeals has nar-
rowed the doctrine significantly. The court essentially has limited
compelled self-publication to the facts of Colonial Stores, with publica-
tion under other circumstances being "voluntary." However, the
court's view of voluntariness emphasizes form over substance. Cer-
tainly a person's actions may be compelled by forces other than law.
As applied by the Georgia Court of Appeals, the "voluntariness" dis-
tinction is an unsatisfactory, indirect way of reaching what may be an
appropriate result-limiting the availability of self-publication claims.
In future cases, the court should take a more direct approach. Rather
than relying on dubious factual distinctions, the court should ac-
knowledge any reservations about the doctrine and place rational, ap-
propriate limits on its application.
In California, courts have been refining the workplace compelled
self-publication doctrine. Recent decisions have reaffirmed the prin-
ciples of McKinney v. County of Santa Clara,20 6 while focusing on the
factual showing required to establish a "strong compulsion" to repub-
lish. Courts have dismissed claims where the plaintiffs have not shown
how publication was compelled.20 7 In addition, courts are requiring
plaintiffs to show that a prospective employer asked the plaintiff for an
explanation of the termination.208 For example, in Davis v. Consoli-
dated Freightways,209 plaintiff, who had been fired for stealing, alleged
he was forced to republish the theft charge in order to explain why he
had left his job. However, because plaintiff "never alleged that any
prospective employers ever asked him about or asked him to explain
the incident,"210 plaintiffs claim lacked the requisite showing of com-
pulsion. Similarly, in Alstad v. Office Depot,211 the federal district court
followed Davis and denied plaintiffs claim where the prospective em-
ployer's interviewers "did not ask plaintiff the reason for his termina-
205 Id. at 718.
206 168 Cal. Rptr. 89 (Ct. App. 1980); see supra text accompanying notes 99-109.
207 See Lin v. Circuit City, Inc., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12065 (C.D. Cal. June 5,
1995); Live Oak Publ'g Co. v. Cohagan, 286 Cal. Rptr. 198, 201-03 (Ct. App. 1991)
(dicta).
208 SeeAlstad v. Office Depot, No. C-94-1400 DLG, 1995 WL 84452 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
7, 1995); Batch v. Russ Berrie & Co., No. C93-20166 RMW (PVT), 1994 WL 634052
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 1994); Davis v. Consolidated Freightways, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438 (Ct.
App. 1994).
209 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438 (Ct. App. 1994).
210 Id. at 449.
211 1995 WL 84452 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 1995).
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tion, and plaintiff did not provide this information."2 12 In addition,
the Alstad court emphasized the nature of the foreseeability require-
ment. Noting that the strong compulsion to republish must be
"known to the originator of the defamatory statement at the time he
communicates it to the person defamed, '213 the court held that the
employer, whose policy precluded giving references to prospective
employers, could not have foreseen any republication.
Here, there is no genuine dispute regarding the facts that Office
Depot had "a strictly enforced policy against giving out any informa-
tion to prospective employers about former employees." Plaintiff
concedes that he knew of and adhered to the policy. As such, plain-
tiff cannot establish the required element that defendant "under-
stood" that plaintiff would be under a "strong compulsion" to
republish his alleged reason for termination.21
4
For the most part, courts in California have clarified the doctrine
in a practical, common sense fashion. Previously, "compulsion" had
evolved as a nebulous concept, based on some sense of an obligation
of truthful disclosure in the job search process. Plaintiffs conse-
quently enjoyed wide latitude for framing causes of action under a
standard they could meet easily. Employers risked lawsuits by former
employees who held subjective feelings of a need for disclosure (or a
desire to create a cause of action) and repeated defamatory explana-
tions whether or not a prospective employer sought the specific infor-
mation. Requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate that a prospective
employer asked for the information narrows the reach of the cause of
action, premising the claim on actual, rather than imagined
compulsion.
On the other hand, Alstad stands on a shaky analytical founda-
tion. In its efforts to limit the doctrine, the court employs questiona-
ble reasoning. The court equates a reference with an employee's
explanation, during ajob interview, of his termination from previous
employment. Including the employee's own statements within the
meaning of "reference" diverges from the more conventional sense of
a reference as a statement by an employer about an employee's job
performance. With this unique view of references, the court has
missed the point. Compelled self-publication is not a problem that
arises out of references. Instead, self-publication claims arise from the
employee's repetition of statements made by the employer to the em-
ployee, which are not covered by an employer's reference policy. To
212 Id. at *2.
213 Id. at *7 (citing Davis, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 448).
214 Alstad, 1995 WL 84452, at *8.
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the extent the existence of a reference policy bears on foreseeability,
the policy would relate to the foreseeability of the employer's communi-
cations about the terminated employee rather than the employee's
own statements. Thus, the court's reference-based analysis has little, if
any, relevance to compelled self-publication claims.
Moreover, Alstad implies that having a policy against providing
references will insulate an employer from defamation liability based
on compelled self-publication.21 5 While Alstad purports to rely on Da-
vis, the decision actually has misread the role of the policy on refer-
ences in that case. In Davis, plaintiff conceded that the employer had
a strictly enforced policy against giving out references. Plaintiff fur-
ther conceded that there was no evidence that any representative of
the employer had ever discussed his termination with any prospective
employers. Thus, the court concluded, plaintiff "failed to show there
was ever any 'negative job reference' attributable to [the employer]
that plaintiff had to explain."216 In that respect, plaintiff could not
show he was compelled to explain a negative job reference. Accord-
ingly, the role of the job reference policy was to establish that no ref-
erence had been given which compelled an explanation by the
plaintiff. The court did not conclude, however, that the mere exist-
ence of a no-reference policy would make a disclosure by the em-
ployee unforeseeable.
The key to Alstad and Davis is that the employees attempted to
create a cause of action when they had not been compelled in any way
to repeat the statements. The Alstad court apparently wanted to place
some limits on the doctrine in order to avoid such frivolous claims.
However, Alstad leaves open the possibility that employers will be insu-
lated from self-publication defamation claims merely because they
have a policy prohibiting references. Given the trend among employ-
ers to forego references as a matter of policy,2 17 this limitation on
claims is an exception that swallows the rule. The Alstad analysis se-
verely limits the doctrine, providing relief for employers, but leaving
deserving plaintiffs without a defamation remedy.
In Texas, courts are divided on the validity of the compelled self-
publication claim. Although recognized by the Corpus Christi Divi-
sion of the Court of Appeal in First State Bank of Corpus Christi v. Ake,21 8
215 For another case taking a similar position, see Mathis v. Boeing Co., 684 F. Supp.
641, 645 (W.D. Wash. 1987) (employer's policy of not revealing reason for discharge
to third parties precludes defamation liability when the employee repeats the em-
ployer's statement).
216 Davis v. Consolidated Freightways, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438, 448 (Ct. App. 1994).
217 See infra text accompanying notes 270-82.
218 606 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
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the doctrine was criticized by the Austin Court of Appeals in Doe v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp.219 The court in Doe refused to recognize the
doctrine, noting that the Texas Supreme Court had not yet adopted
the doctrine. Doe also criticized Ake, contending that the Ake decision
rested on an inaccurate analysis of comment m to Restatement (Second)
of Torts section 577. The Doe court emphasized that section 577 com-
ment m requires the plaintiff to be unaware of the repeated state-
ment's defamatory nature-a requirement not extended to workplace
self-publication claims. 220
Other state and federal courts in Texas have been approaching
self-publication defamation cases cautiously. Even where the claim is
recognized, plaintiffs are losing on the grounds of insufficient evi-
dence.2 21 Texas courts acknowledge that the law is unsettled and that
self-publication defamation is "not . . .recognized by all the Texas
courts. '222 Although Doe reached the Texas Supreme Court on ap-
peal, the appeal did not address the issue of self-publication defama-
tion.2 23 Thus, as the Fifth Circuit has observed, the status of the
workplace self-publication doctrine is "still open in Texas."
224
The question remains open in New York as well. The New York
Court of Appeals has not yet decided a compelled self-publication
case. Meanwhile, state appellate courts and federal courts in New
York have been making their own pronouncements with mixed re-
219 855 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. App. 1993), affd on other grounds, 903 S.W.2d 347 (Tex.
1995).
220 Id. at 259; see also Eble, supra note 9, at 757-58 (questioning Ake's interpretation
of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577 cmt. m); Mouser, supra note 4, at 260 (same).
221 See, e.g., Hardwick v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 881 S.W.2d 195, 199 (Tex.
App. 1994) (publication was not compelled where "the alleged slander was made
prior to [plaintiff's] knowing he was to be fired, and thus prior to his self-publica-
tion"; court declined to address the self-publication claim); Reeves v. Western Co. of
N. Am., 867 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. App. 1993) (no testimony to support plaintiffs com-
pelled self-publication claim); Marshall Field Stores, Inc. v. Gardiner, 859 S.W.2d 391
(Tex. App. 1993) (plaintiff did not present evidence to the jury at trial on the issue of
compelled self-publication).
222 Reeves, 867 S.W.2d at 395; cf Purcell v. Seguin State Bank & Trust Co., 999 F.2d
950, 959 (5th Cir. 1993) (Texas courts recognize "narrow exception of self-compelled
defamation" (quoting Chasewood Constr. Co. v. Rico, 696 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. App.
1985))); First State Bank of Corpus Christi v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App.
1980).
223 See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Doe, 903 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1995) (addressing
plaintiff's claim that independent drug testing laboratory had a duty to tell plaintiff or
her employer that consumption of poppy seeds would cause a positive drug test
result).
224 Duffy v. Leading Edge Prods., 44 F.3d 308, 312 n.5 (5th Cir. 1995). For a
discussion of compelled self-publication in Texas, see Eble, supra note 9.
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suits. The New York opinions range from thoughtful; considered
analyses of the doctrine's merits to conclusory, bare-bones discussions.
In the most recent state court opinion, Wright v. Guainello,2 25 the
Supreme Court of Kings County approvingly acknowledged the com-
pelled self-publication doctrine, noting that "its recognition in New
York has been forecast in several thoughtful opinions."226 However,
federal-rather than state-courts had rendered the opinions cited in
Wright.227 Accordingly, the court also discussed two state court opin-
ions rejecting the doctrine,228 while pointing out that the decisions
did so without discussing the doctrine's merits.229 In keeping with the
trend of a more thoughtful review, Wright presented a detailed
analysis.
Heartshare Human Services fired Wright, a caregiver for develop-
mentally disabled persons, charging that he had physically and psy-
chologically abused a patient. Wright denied the charges and filed a
defamation action. In his lawsuit, Wright also asserted that he had
applied for other jobs and the patient abuse charge would adversely
affect his chances for future employment. Noting that an honest indi-
vidual would feel compelled to disclose the reason given for termina-
tion, the court applied the doctrine of compelled self-publication.
The court observed that compelled self-publication claims provide an
important limitation on abusive employer behavior. As the court
explained:
Nothing in the 100-year history of "at will" employment permits an
employer to go beyond the boundary of ending one employment by
inventing a knowingly false charge that it can foresee will foreclose
any future employability, where the circumstances bespeak a strong
compulsion by the employee to self-publish the stated grounds. A
225 635 N.Y.S.2d 995 (Sup. Ct. 1995).
226 Id. at 997 (citing Weldy v. Piedmont Airlines, No. CIV-88-628E, 1989 WL
158342 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1989), afjfd, 1991 WL 5147 (W.D.N.Y.Jan. 15, 1991), rev'd
mem., 1992 WL 73175 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1992) (plaintiff failed to meet burden of
proof on slander and "compelled self-defamation" claims), rev'd on other grounds, 985
F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1993)); Metchick v. Bidermann Indus. Corp., No. 91-CIV-2329
(PNL), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4278 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Mandelblatt v. Perelman, 693 F.
Supp. 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Elmore v. Shell Oil Co., 733 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
227 Excluding Wright, New York state court opinions have not analyzed the merits
of the compelled-self publication doctrine. See infra text accompanying note 234.
228 Wieder v. Chemical Bank, 608 N.Y.S.2d 195 (App. Div.), appeal denied, 639
N.E.2d 417 (N.Y. 1994); see also infra text accompanying note 234.
229 See Wright, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 997.
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license to fire at will does not carry with it permission to poison with
immunity.
230
In contrast, consider Wieder v. Chemical Bank.23' In that case, the
Supreme Court, New York County, rejected the doctrine, writing a
brief opinion with virtually no analysis. Rather than offering any sub-
stantive criticism of the doctrine, the court simply stated that it had
"previously rejected a similar argument in Weintraub v. Phillips, Nizer,
Benjamin, Krim & Ballon.''232 However, the Wieder and Weintraub cases
are distinguishable in a critical respect. Weintraub rejected a defama-
tion claim based on the plaintiff's voluntar---not compelled-publica-
tion of the defamatory statement. As the court stated, there was no
defamation claim because "[p] laintiff has failed to allege or establish
publication to a third party, nor, as plaintiff concedes, does New York
law recognize a claim for defamation where the plaintiff himself volun-
tarily republishes the alleged defamatory words." 233 However, plaintiff
Wieder's claim was based on the Lewis theory, an argument that publi-
cation was compelled rather than voluntary. Accordingly, the Wieder
court's reliance on Weintraub is misplaced. The compelled self-publi-
cation issue raised in Wiedershould have been addressed on the merits
rather than summarily pushed aside in reliance on a factually inappo-
site case.
In New York, compelled self-publication cases have arisen most
frequently in federal courts. Generally, federal courts in New York
have considered the question unresolved under New York state law,
and the federal courts are divided regarding whether the doctrine
should be accepted or rejected.23 4 Given that the New York Court of
230 Id. at 998. Wright does, however, represent an atypical case. The employer was
a state agency, and the court therefore considered compelled self-publication in the
context of constitutional due process principles. In accordance with such principles,
the court concluded the employer's charges against Wright were stigmatizing and
ordered a hearing to clear Wright's name. Id. While the constitutional due process
analysis provides a different remedy than common law defamation, the court's analy-
sis of the merits of compelled self-publication defamation should be instructive for
other cases.
231 608 N.Y.S.2d 195 (App. Div.), appeal denied, 639 N.E.2d 417 (N.Y. 1994).
232 Id. at 196.
233 Weintraub, 568 N.Y.2d at 85 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
234 Recognizing the doctrine: Chrzanowski v. Lichtman, 884 F. Supp. 751
(W.D.N.Y. 1995) (but facts did not establish a claim); Weldy v. Piedmont Airlines, No.
CIV-88-628E, 1989 WL 158342 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1989), affd, 1991 WL 5147
(W.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1991), rev'd menr, 1992 WL 73175 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1992), rev'd
on other grounds, 985 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1993); Mandelblatt v. Perelman, 683 F. Supp. 379
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); Elmore v. Shell Oil Co., 733 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). But see
Tischmann v. ITT/Sheraton Corp., 882 F. Supp. 1358 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). The Southern
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Appeals has consistently refused to weaken employers' prerogative to
discharge workers at will,235 it seems unlikely that the New York high
court would embrace compelled self-publication because the doctrine
expands employers' liability for terminations.
Outside of Minnesota, courts in New York, Texas, and California
have given the greatest consideration to compelled self-publication.
The status of the doctrine remains in flux, with no clear trend toward
acceptance or rejection in state courts. 236 With the exception of a few
cases that wholeheartedly embrace the doctrine,237 federal courts
District of New York in Tischmann relied on Wwider, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 195, to conclude
that "New York law does not recognize this cause of action." Tischmann, 882 F. Supp.
at 1371. Prior to Weder, the Southern District court had been skeptical of the doc-
trine and either declined to recognize it or decided that even if New York law would
recognize the claim, the facts in particular cases did not merit a cause of action. See,
e.g., Metchick v. Bidermann Indus. Corp., No. 91-CIV-2329 (PNL), 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4278 (S.D.N.Y Apr. 6, 1993); Mendoza v. SSC & B Lintas, 799 F. Supp. 1502
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); McNabb v. MacAndrews & Forbes Group, No. CIV2663, 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18383 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 1991), aff'd, 972 F.2d 1328 (2d Cir. 1992); J.
Crew Group v. Griffin, No. 90-CIV-2663(KL), 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15835 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 27, 1990); Burger v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater N.Y., 684 F. Supp. 46 (S.D.N.Y.
1988); Mandelblatt, 683 F. Supp. at 379.
235 For example, New York has refused to recognize causes of action for wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy and breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y.
1983).
236 Workplace compelled self-publication defamation claims have been recog-
nized in the following state court cases: McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 89 (Ct. App. 1980); Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336 (Colo. 1988);
Colonial Stores v. Barrett, 38 S.E.2d 306 (Ga. Ct. App. 1946); Grist v. Upjohn Co., 168
N.W.2d 389 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969); Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the
United States, 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986); Heberholt v. DePaul Community
Health Ctr., 625 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1981); Wright v. Guarinello, 629 N.Y.S.2d 378 (Sup.
Ct. 1995); Downs v. Waremart, Inc., 903 P.2d 888 (Or. Ct. App. 1995); First State Bank
of Corpus Christi v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); see also Bretz v. Mayer,
203 N.E.2d 665 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1963) (minister presented to congregation defama-
tory letter expelling him as church pastor).
The following state court cases have rejected workplace compelled self-publica-
tion defamation claims: Gore v. Health-Tex, Inc., 567 So. 2d 1307 (Ala. 1990); Atkins
v. Indus. Telecomm. Ass'n, 660 A.2d 885 (D.C. 1995) (applying Virginia law); Layne v.
Builders Plumbing Supply Co., Inc., 569 N.E.2d 1104 (111. App. Ct. 1991); Merritt v.
Detroit Mem'l Hosp., 265 N.W.2d 124 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (self-publication viewed
as consent); Wieder v. Chemical Bank, 608 N.Y.S.2d 195 (App. Div. 1994), appeal de-
nied, 639 N.E.2d 417 (N.Y. 1994); Yetter v. Ward Trucking Corp., 585 A.2d 1022 (Pa.
Super. Ct.), appeal denied, 600 A.2d 539 (Pa. 1991); Doe v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,
855 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. App. 1993), affd on other grounds, 903 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1995);
Lunz v. Neuman, 290 P.2d 697 (Wash. 1955).
237 See, e.g., Thompto v. Coborn's, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 1097, 1125 (N.D. Iowa 1994);
Weldy v. Piedmont Airlines, No. CIV-88-6228E, 1989 WL 158342 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 22,
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have approached the doctrine with suspicion, caution, or a mixture of
both.23 8 Generally, federal judges have deferred to state courts and
declined to adopt the doctrine, until, in the words of an Indiana fed-
eral district court, "the judicial landmarks are so clearly evident as to
point to a single direction.
'239
The federal court in Indiana may be waiting for some time to
come. Existing case law demonstrates that judicial landmarks are not
clear and do not point in a single direction. Compelled self-publica-
tion remains a controversial doctrine, with fervent proponents and
opponents who generally stake their positions along the line of pro-
plaintiff/anti-employer and pro-employer/anti-plaintiff sentiment.
Given the ever-rising number of employment-related defamation ac-
tions and their impact on workplace relationships, courts and com-
mentators should look beyond sharply drawn, partisan lines of
employer-employee interests. A new view-accommodating the inter-
ests of employers, employees and the public-should emerge.
1989), rev'd on other grounds, 985 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1993); Elmore v. Shell Oil Co., 733 F.
Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Polson v. Davis, 635 F. Supp. 1130 (D. Kan. 1986) afld,
895 F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1990).
238 See, e.g., Starr v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 54 F.3d 1548, 1554 (10th Cir. 1995) ("In
the absence of any Oklahoma authority, federal district courts have concluded that
'Oklahoma would not follow the self-publication theory' because 'the vast majority of
states considering the issue reject it."' (quoting Hensley v. Armstrong World Indus.,
Inc., 798 F. Supp. 653, 657 (W.D. Okla. 1992))); De Leon v. St. Joseph Hosp., Inc.,
871 F.2d 1229, 1237 (4th Cir. 1989) ("The theory of self-publication has not gained
widespread acceptance and De Leon could cite no Maryland authority for his proposi-
tion."); Bickling v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 872 F. Supp. 1299, 1311 (D. Del. 1994)
("Whatever the merits of plaintiff's compelled self-publication theory, the Court need
not predict whether the Supreme Court of Delaware would recognize compelled self-
publication as the law of Delaware. Assuming, without deciding, that plaintiff has met
his summary judgment burden to show publication of a defamatory statement, the
Court will grant defendants' motion because Delaware's qualified privilege would ap-
ply to the facts of this case ... ."); Daigle v. Computrac, 835 F. Supp. 903, 907 (E.D.
La. 1993) ("Reading the tea leaves of Louisiana case literature, however, leads this
Court to conclude that Louisiana courts would likely not adopt this controversial and
attenuated theory of delictual conduct."); Yeitrakis v. Schering-Plough Corp., 804 F.
Supp. 238, 250 (D.N.M. 1992) ("the Court was obliged to conclude Count II did not
state a claim as New Mexico has yet to recognize a cause of action for self-defama-
tion"), affd without opinion, 10 Indiv. Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 960 (10th Cir.
1995) (reported in full, No. 93-2187, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 7741 (10th Cir. Apr. 6,
1995)); Sarratore v. Longview Van Corp., 666 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Ind. 1987).
239 Sarratore, 666 F. Supp. at 1264.
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III. COMPETING CONCERNS REGARDING WORKPLACE
SELF-PUBLICATION
A. Benefits of Recognizing Compelled Self-Publication Claims
Recognition of defamation claims based on self-publication ex-
pands the remedies available to discharged workers. Defamation
claims can be based on one-to-one communications between an em-
ployer and employee. Unless expressly prohibited, successful plain-
tiffs may recover punitive damages.240  For compelled self-
publication's proponents, the increased scope of liability is an accept-
able trade-off for protecting the reputation interests of employees and
encouraging employers to be truthful in their evaluations of employ-
ees.2 4 ' The expanded remedy also provides additional protection for
employees, as self-publication defamation actions supplement existing
wrongful discharge theories or substitutes for such causes of action
where courts do not recognize wrongful discharge claims.
242
Those favoring recognition of compelled self-publication defama-
tion acknowledge the doctrine's weaknesses and the potential
problems it creates in the workplace. 243 However, for proponents, the
240 In Minnesota, plaintiffs cannot recover punitive damages in compelled self-
publication defamation actions. Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United
States, 389 N.W.2d 876, 892 (Minn. 1986).
241 Id. at 888 (The plaintiffs' only choice would be to give the employer's stated
reason "or to lie. . . . Fabrication, however, is an unacceptable alternative.");
Langvardt, supra note 3, at 278 & n.289 ("Recognition of the doctrine provides an
added incentive, albeit a negative one, for employers to be truthful in their statements
to employees concerning the reasons for their terminations .... Such negative incen-
tive is the danger of defamation liability that may attach to the making of false state-
ments."); Siegel, supra note 9, at 31 ("[B]ecause it minimizes reputation damage
without unreasonably chilling communication, the compelled self-publication theory
is superior with respect to this long-held value [of reputation]. Under this view, origi-
nators and defamed parties are provided with incentives to prevent harm to reputa-
tions. . . . The compelled self-publication theory of defamation best protects
reputations by giving all parties an incentive against publishing false information.").
242 Larson, supra note 6, at 45 (noting that defamation lawsuits "have become par-
ticularly popular" in jurisdictions with entrenched employment-at-will rules and are
"increasingly advanced as substitutes for wrongful discharge actions"); Mastry, supra
note 9, at 1098 (self-publication action as a "useful alternative for alleviating the ef-
fects of at-will employment). But see Langvardt, supra note 3, at 273-74 (arguing that
the doctrine is not a substitute for wrongful discharge because defamation actions
vindicate reputational loss, not job loss).
243 See Langvardt, supra note 3, at 270-75 (general analysis of doctrine's weak-
nesses); Robert A. Prentice & BrendaJ. Winslett, Employee References: Will a "No Corn-
ment"Policy Protect Employers Against Liabilityfor Defamation., 25 AM. Bus. LJ. 207, 228-
38 (1987) (acknowledging several arguments against recognizing the compelled self-
publication doctrine, but concluding that the arguments "lack persuasive force when
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importance of providing a remedy to employees outweighs the doc-
trine's problematic aspects. The doctrine promotes accountability,
holding employers responsible for foreseeable injury caused by false
explanations of terminations. 244 To the extent the doctrine expands
liability for defamation, negative ramifications are mitigated by the de-
fenses of qualified privilege and truth. Qualified privilege serves the
interests of both the employer and society, proponents argue, because
the privilege shields communications made in good faith, and the
availability of the privilege tends to encourage employers to inform
employees of the justifications for terminations. 245 In addition, those
favoring the doctrine emphasize that employers have an absolute de-
fense, notwithstanding compulsion and foreseeability of republica-
tion, where the statement made by the employer is proven to be
true.2 46 Thus, the argument proceeds, employers acting in good faith
are protected from liability and will ultimately win compelled self-pub-
closely scrutinized"); Murray, supra note 9, at 317-20 (chilled workplace communica-
tions resulting from threat of lawsuits). For this author's view of the doctrine's weak-
nesses, see infra discussion at Part III.B.
244 See Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 888 (doctrine holds employer liable for damages
"fairly viewed as the direct result of the [employer's] actions"); McKinney v. County of
Santa Clara, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89, 94 (Ct. App. 1980) (rationale for liability is "the strong
causal link between the actions of the [employer] and the damage caused by the
republication); Langvardt, supra note 3, at 275-76; HowardJ. Siegel, supra note 242, at
18; Murray, supra note 9, at 319.
245 As an example, the majority in Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United
States considered the qualified privilege to be adequate insurance that liability would
be appropriately circumscribed:
[R] ecognition of a qualified privilege seems to be the only effective means of
addressing the concern that every time an employer states the reason for
discharging an employee it will subject itself to potential liability for defama-
tion. It is in the public interest that information regarding an employee's
discharge be readily available to the discharged employee and to prospective
employers, and we are concerned that, unless a significant privilege is recog-
nized by the courts, employers will decline to inform employees of reasons
for discharges. We conclude that an employer's communication to an em-
ployee of the reason for discharge may present a proper occasion upon
which to recognize a qualified privilege.
Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 890 (citations omitted); see also Langvardt, supra note 3, at 274
(qualified privilege as a "formidable shield" against liability); Paetzold & Willborn,
supra note 3, at 133 (qualified privilege gives employers the opportunity to limit po-
tential defamation liability); Murray, supra note 9, at 319 (arguing that privilege pro-
vides adequate protection for employers).
246 See, e.g., Langvardt, supra note 3, at 274 (falsity requirement as "formidable
shield" against liability); Murray, supra note 9, at 319 (arguing that truth provides
adequate protection for employers).
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lication actions filed against them. Only dishonest and malicious em-
ployers will end up paying tort judgments.
Moreover, under Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the
United States, plaintiffs may not recover punitive damages in compelled
self-publication defamation actions.247 Conceptually, the punitive
damages exclusion safeguards the interests of the employer and soci-
ety in two ways. First, by precluding punitive damages and thereby
limiting the potential recovery, Lewis decreases the incentive for plain-
tiffs to republish their employers' defamatory statements. Second,
without the threat of liability for punitive damages, employers would
feel more comfortable stating reasons for discharge to employees.
Thus, it is argued, prohibiting punitive damages encourages the free
flow of information, which is an important interest for employers and
society in general.
248
Certainly the qualified privilege and truth defense limit liabil-
ity.249 Similarly, prohibiting punitive damages awards decreases em-
ployers' financial exposure. However, liability and financial exposure
are not the only costs to be considered in fashioning rules concerning
workplace defamation claims. While recognition of self-publication
claims may encourage employers to be more truthful and diligent in
their conferences with soon-to-be discharged employees, it is equally
likely to deter employers from giving information-truthful or other-
wise, defamatory or not-to avoid even the possibility of litigation. 250
247 Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 891-92.
248 Regardless of its impact on information flow, the prohibition on recovery of
punitive damages fails to serve societal interests because it sweeps too broadly. By
prohibiting punitive damages in all self-publication defamation actions, the rule pre-
cludes punitive damages in cases of malicious employer conduct, where punitive dam-
ages would be appropriate. Langvardt, supra, note 9, at 289; Mastry, supra note 9, at
1107.
249 But see Harrison v. Arrow Metal Prods. Corp., 174 N.W.2d 875 (Mich. Ct. App.
1969) (when employer accused employee of theft, the court allowed no qualified priv-
ilege as the employer's statement was libelous per se, therefore the employer was
strictly liable for defamation.).
250 See, e.g., Langvardt, supra note 3, at 270 (observing that many employers
"choose... to avoid the prospect of litigation based upon compelled self-publication
by remaining completely silent, even to the discharged employee, concerning the rea-
son for the employment termination"); Larson, supra note 6, at 49 (warning that rec-
ognition of self-publication defamation "may further discourage already cautious
employers from providing honest reasons to an employee regarding his discharge");
Mouser, supra note 4, at 287 ("When the tort theory allows an employee to recover for
an injury occurring through self-publication, most employers will conclude that the
best way to avoid liability is to withhold the reasons for termination from the em-
ployee . . . . "); Koslow, supra note 6, at 100; Middleton, supra note 6, at 1;
Stricharchuk, supra note 2, at 33.
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Consequently, even if the doctrine deters abuse, it also deters commu-
nication of useful and needed information in the workplace.
B. Problems with Current Formulations
of the Doctrine of Compelled Self-Publication
Current formulations of the doctrine of self-publication may pro-
vide acceptable solutions for "hard cases." However, the occasional
hard case should not provide the impetus for formulating workplace
legal standards. Courts should develop legal principles that make
sense for daily workplace relations as well as cases of egregious em-
ployer conduct. In this regard, the existing doctrine of self-publica-
tion fails because it has unsettling adverse consequences for
workplace relationships and wrongful termination litigation. The
standards are easily met; "foreseeable compulsion" will be found
rather easily in virtually all terminations when a discharged employee
applies for other jobs.251 The essence of the claim-publication by
the plaintiff rather than the defendant-discourages plaintiffs from
mitigating damages.2 52 Because the self-publication action can be
based on communications made to the employee in confidence, em-
ployers may attempt to avoid liability by withholding the justifications
for terminations. Scholars, practitioners, and journalists who observe
workplace behavior agree that many employers prefer a strategy of
251 Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 896 (Kelley, J., dissenting); Langvardt, supra note 3, at 272
(elements easily satisfied); Ronald Turner, Compelled Self-Publication: How Discharge Be-
gets Defamation, 14 EMPLOYEE RsL. LJ. 19, 27-28 (1988) ("'Compulsion' within the
meaning of the doctrine would automatically occur when a prospective employer asks
an applicant for his or her employment history and reason(s) for leaving the previous
place of employment, and the applicant repeats the termination reason given by the
former employer .... Accordingly, a plaintiff in a 'compelled' defamation case will be
able to establish . . .publication . . .in the probable and most likely event that a
prospective employer asks standard and indeed necessary questions regarding an ap-
plicant's employment history."); Mastry, supra note 9. at 1108 ("'Falsity' and 'compul-
sion' are so broadly defined in Lewis that together they establish a basis for almost
every involuntarily discharged employee to bring a claim of self-publication defama-
tion."). Where courts focus on likely repetition rather than compulsion, establishing
a foreseeable publication is even easier. See, e.g., Neighbors v. Kirksville College of
Osteopathic Med., 694 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (foreseeable publication stan-
dard); First State Bank of Corpus Christi v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980)
(likelihood standard).
252 Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 896 (Kelley, J., dissenting); accord Layne v. Builders
Plumbing Supply Co, Inc., 569 N.E.2d 1104, 1111. (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); see also Posey,
supra note 58, at 483 (recognition of self-publication claims presents "an open invita-
tion for the discharged employee to create his own wrong, implicate the defendant of
his choice, aggravate rather than mitigate damages, and collect for the self-inflicted
injury"); infra text accompanying notes 260-69.
[VOL- 72:2
BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD CASE
silence over the potential protection provided by the qualified privi-
lege and truth defenses.253 These problems account for complete re-
jection of self-publication by many courts and confusion concerning
the doctrine in other courts. Each of the concerns is addressed below.
1. Ease of Meeting the Requirements for a Cause of Action
As currently structured, the requirements for actionable self-pub-
lication give rise to a cause of action in most, if not every, termination
based on performance problems or misconduct. The problem is most
apparent in the version of the doctrine which permits an action based
on a foreseeable republication. Most terminated employees will seek
employment for economic reasons; those who are contemplating liti-
gation also should seek alternative employment in efforts to mitigate
damages. Whatever the reason, virtually all terminated employees will
seek new employment and face inquiries from prospective employers
concerning job performance and reasons for leaving the most recent
employment.254 Certainly employers know this. Thus, the standard
for foreseeability of publication is easily met in almost any case.
Requiring self-publication to be "compelled" may at first glance
seem to limit the scope of the tort. However, the compulsion require-
ment adds only scant protection against frivolous actions or the threat
of frivolous actions. The element of compulsion refers to the obliga-
tion to respond truthfully to questions in ajob interview. The plaintiff
is compelled to publish the defamatory job evaluation because
"fabrication... is an unacceptable alternative."25 5 While one cannot
seriously dispute the importance of encouraging truthful disclosure in
job interviews, it does not follow that the need for truth of disclosure
provides a meaningful basis for distinguishing self-publications which
are actionable from those which are not. Compulsion, when deter-
mined by the need for truthful disclosure in job interviews, exists in
every case where a terminated employee goes for ajob interview. The
compulsion standard is easily met, being applicable in marginal as
well as compelling cases.
2 56
253 See infra text accompanying notes 270-77.
254 See Turner, supra note 251, at 27-28.
255 Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876,
888 (Minn. 1986).
256 I& at 896 (Kelley, J., dissenting) ("In claims brought by ex-employees against
employers for defamation when the employment was terminated for 'incompetence,'
'dishonesty,' 'insubordination' or for any other reason carrying a connotation of im-
morality, ineptness, or improbity, 'compulsion' will almost automatically be found in
connection with future job applications by the discharged employee. Such 'compul-
sion' would, with certainty, be foreseeable by the ex-employer."); see also Turner,
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Some courts attempt to make the plaintiffs burden heavier by
requiring the plaintiff to prove that a prospective employer actually
asked the plaintiff about the reasons for leaving the previous em-
ployer.257 If the plaintiff fails to allege or present such evidence, the
self-publication claim fails. Courts may require a plaintiff to demon-
strate that she republished the defamatory statement in response to a
direct inquiry from a prospective employer. If so, a plaintiff who re-
peats defamatory reasons for termination in a written response to an
employment application questionnaire may not have a self-publica-
tion claim. 258 Such common sense requirements preclude plaintiffs
from prevailing based on conclusory allegations of compelled disclo-
sure. This slightly heavier burden is a welcome addition to compelled
self-publication defamation. However, this requirement alone does
not go far enough. After all, the question "why did you leave your last
job?" is a routine feature of the job search process. Thus, without
further limitations on the cause of action, most plaintiffs can routinely
establish compulsion.
The discharged employee can meet the self-publication test easily.
He likely will seek other employment. A prospective employer pre-
dictably will ask about his employment history. The result is an
open invitation for the discharged employee to create his own
wrong, implicate the defendant of his choice, aggravate rather than
mitigate damages, and collect for the self-inflicted injury.
259
With publication-and thus the cause of action-under plain-
tiff's control, courts should assure that plaintiffs take steps to mitigate
damages. Otherwise, litigious plaintiffs can enhance their potential
recovery by repeating the reasons for termination to as many employ-
ers as possible.
2. Mitigation of Damages
Like traditional defamation actions, the claim based on self-publi-
cation begins with communication of a defamatory statement by the
supra note 251, at 27-28; Mastry, supra note 9, at 1108. For an interesting contrasting
view, compare Langvardt, supra note 3, at 272 (arguing that the fact that the fired
employee's disclosure is always foreseeable adds legitimacy to claims of injury caused
by self-publication defamation).
257 See, e.g., Davis v. Consolidated Freightways, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438 (Ct. App.
1994); see also Reeves v. Western Co. of N. Am., 867 S.W.2d 385, 395 (Tex. App. 1993)
(where there was no specific testimony from a prospective employer concerning dis-
closure, court found no evidence to show compelled self-publication; plaintiff's "spec-
ulation about possible consequences" did not support the claim).
258 E.g., Sigmon v. Womack, 279 S.E.2d 254 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981).
259 Posey, supra note 58, at 482.
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defendant. Unlike traditional defamation actions, however, the dam-
aging publication consists of the plaintiff's repetition of the statement.
Plaintiff, as the republisher, essentially controls the cause of action.
Once the employer makes the statement to the employee, defamation
liability flows from an event-plaintiffs republication-that is not
under the defendant's control. In an increasingly litigious society,
this aspect of the tort could encourage a fired employee to repeat the
defamatory statements in job interviews so as to maximize damages.
2 60
The possibility of recovering damages in a self-publication claim
"might encourage publication of a defamatory statement by a plaintiff
who reasonably could have avoided such republication or could have
tried to explain to a prospective employer the true nature of the situa-
tion and to contradict the defamatory statement."
261
For example, consider the plaintiffs in Lewis v. Equitable Life Assur-
ance Society of the United States, fired for "gross insubordination," and
not hired when they repeated this reason for termination. The Lewis
majority permitted the claim for self-publication, concluding that the
plaintiff s only alternative was to lie to prospective employers. How-
ever, the majority overlooked an alternative to fabrication-explana-
tion. After all, the plaintiffs could have explained that they were fired
for refusing to make changes to their expense reports,262 which would
have been a true, non-defamatory characterization of the reason for
termination.263 Such an explanation would have avoided repetition of
the defamatory statement or at least minimized its impact.
Instead, in its analysis of the mitigation issue, the Lewis majority
concluded that mitigation was not a problem when liability was based
on foreseeable compulsion.26 Moreover, the court felt the duty to
mitigate could be protected by requiring plaintiffs "to take all reason-
able steps to explain the true nature of the situation and to contradict
260 Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876,
896 (Minn. 1986) (Kelley, J., dissenting) (arguing that recognition of doctrine dis-
courages plaintiffs from mitigating damages; for example, plaintiffs in Lewis dismissed
declaratory relief claim that would have expunged the defamatory reason for termina-
tion from their records; and judge concluded plaintiffs did so "because expungement
would lower, if not eliminate, recovery of future defamation damages"); Posey, supra
note 58, at 482.
261 Layne v. Builders Plumbing Supply Co., 569 N.E.2d 1104, 1111 (Ill. App. Ct.
1991) (rejecting doctrine of compelled "self-defamation").
262 Lewis et al., supra note 2, at 837.
263 Id at 860 ("The holdings in Lewis also provide much potential for abuse and
little for mitigation. In Lewis, for example, the plaintiffs could simply have related the
circumstances surrounding their discharges without whispering even a defamatory
syllable.").
264 Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 888.
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the defamatory statement. '265 Apparently applying the general rule
that mitigation is an affirmative defense, the court noted that Equita-
ble had not pointed to any reasonable course of conduct that the
plaintiffs could have taken to mitigate their damages. 266 So while the
court recognized that mitigation could be a problematic issue in self-
publication defamation claims, the court did not clearly state the role
of mitigation as either a requirement of the claim or a factor to be
considered. 267 The Lewis majority should have given closer attention
to mitigation,268 and made mitigation a clear requirement of the
cause of action. 2
69
Other courts adopting the doctrine should ensure that mitigation
is clearly stated as a doctrinal requirement. At a minimum, a success-
ful self-publication claim must be premised on a showing that the
plaintiff made a reasonable effort to explain the circumstances of the
termination. In addition, if the employer proves that the plaintiff en-
gaged in unnecessary or unsolicited repetition of the defamatory state-
ment, courts should refuse to find compulsion. Because the claim
essentially is plaintiff-controlled, mitigation should not be limited to
an affirmative defense. Courts should make mitigation an element of
the prima facie case for defamation caused by compelled self-publica-
tion. If compulsion is what courts require, a plaintiff should be com-
pelled by the circumstances of the case rather than by the prospect of
tort recovery.
3. Chilling Effect on Workplace Communications
Free exchange of personnel information in the workplace is vital
to businesses and society.270 However, the spectre of defamation lia-
bility threatens a substantial chill on the flow of workplace informa-
tion. In states where courts have recognized the doctrine of
compelled self-publication, human resources, legal and other employ-
ment advisors admonish employers to provide limited or no informa-
tion when terminating employees. 271 To ward off defamation lawsuits,
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Mastry, supra note 9, at 1103.
268 Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876,
896 (Minn. 1986) (Kelley, J., dissenting).
269 See Mastry, supra note 9, at 1103 n.56 (language of the majority opinion in
Lewis does not clearly state whether mitigation evidence is required to establish the
claim or whether mitigation is a mere factor for courts to evaluate).
270 Lewis et al., supra note 2, at 800-01; see also Reed & Henkel, supra note 36, at
306.
271 See supra text accompanying notes 11-16.
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many employers are embracing the strategy of silence, as they provide
minimal information to terminated employees. 272 Knowing that a for-
mer employee may bring a defamation claim for information commu-
nicated only from employer to the employee, many employers err on
the side of caution. They remain tight-lipped rather than risk a self-
publication suit based on an inaccurate evaluation.
Some observers argue that this employer silence results not from
caution but from paranoia. They blame an exaggerated threat of def-
amation liability for the popularity of limited information strate-
gies. 273  Employers who adopt such strategies are behaving
irrationally, or, at best, crafting workplace policy based on mispercep-
tions about the prevalence of defamation claims, their costs, and the
likelihood of losing defamation lawsuits. 274 Accordingly, employers
simply are overreacting to highly publicized large plaintiffs' verdicts
when typical employment defamation cases are resolved for far less. 275
Moreover, employers can adopt policies other than silence to protect
themselves from defamation liability, so the chilling effect is mini-
mized.276 However, employers' fears and responses, even if irrational
or based on misperceptions, are real and must be taken into account
in fashioning employee remedies.
277
272 See, e.g., Langvardt, supra note 3, at 270 (employers seek "to avoid the prospect
of litigation ... by remaining completely silent, even to the discharged employee,
concerning the reason for employment termination"). But see Prentice & Winslett,
supra note 243, at 234 (arguing that because specific feedback creates "a happier,
more loyal, and more efficient work force," the authors "think it highly unlikely that
adoption of the doctrine of compelled self-publication will have this effect").
273 See Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 3, at 124, 140-42 (arguing that the limited
information trend is "either irrational, or is rational but based on biases in
perceptions").
274 Id at 123-24. Ms. Paetzold and Professor Willborn argue that contrary to popu-
lar perceptions, the relative frequencies of employment defamation litigation proba-
bly has not increased, employees seldom recover, and the size of recoveries has
declined. Their conclusions are based on their survey of reported employment defa-
mation cases between 1965-1970 and 1985-1990. Id.
275 Id. at 140-41.
276 Murray, supra note 9, at 319 (advocating disciplinary systems based on docu-
mentation, corroboration and honesty as alternatives to refusal to provide informa-
tion); see also Prentice & Winslett, supra note 243, at 226-27 (arguing that adopting the
compelled self-publication doctrine encourages employers "to make good decisions,
to document them, and to communicate them" and, in addition, arguing that poten-
tial defamation liability encourages employers to investigate and evaluate the facts
before terminating or disciplining employees).
277 As one commentator noted in response to the argument that recognition of
self-publication claims should not discourage employers from providing information
to employees and should not increase employer liability:
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Reluctance of employers to provide information creates problems
for all parties in the workplace. Employees terminated for perform-
ance or conduct problems may not get sufficiently candid assessments
which could help them improve performance 278 or avoid repetition of
mistakes in future jobs.279 The silence policy also erodes employees'
protection against false claims. An employer's refusal to explain rea-
sons for terminations deprives employees of information that may per-
mit them to challenge, and possibly reverse, erroneous decisions.28
0 If
no information is given, employees will take their problems to the
next workplace, where new co-workers will have the burden of work-
ing with problem employees. 281 Additionally, where "no comment" is
the employer's policy at termination, employees who perform well
may not get the benefit of positive references. 28 2 These consequences
may be exacerbated if overly cautious employers become concerned
about self-publication claims arising from communications to employ-
ees concerning disciplinary actions short of termination.
283
Two advocates of the adoption of this compelled self-publication theory
claim that undue increase in employer's liability is unlikely "if attorneys do
their job and explain to clients the realities of defamation litigation." This
assessment fails to take into account, however, employers' practical consider-
ations as well as their natural reactions. These factors cannot be ignored as
such an assessment should focus on an employer's perspective ....
Ann M. Barry, Comment, Defamation in the Workplace: The Impact of Increasing Employer
Liability, 72 MARQ. L. REV. 264, 298-99 (1989) (responding to Prentice & Winslett,
supra note 243, at 235 (1987)).
278 Moul, supra note 9, at 1191 (stating that information about performance en-
ables workers to improve their performance, thus increasing productivity and pos-
sibilities for promotions).
279 Lewis et al., supra note 2, at 859 (stating that adoption of compelled self-publi-
cation signals employers to refuse to disclose the reasons for discharge, which pre-
vents employees from learning of performance or other problems); Reed & Henkel,
supra note 36, at 306 (stating that informing unsatisfactory employees of the basis for
discharge is "an informative step that benefits employees").
280 Lewis et al., supra note 2, at 859; see also Mastry, supra note 9, at 1113 (arguing
that nondisclosure of reasons for discharge deprives employees of information neces-
sary to bring claims when they have been discharged maliciously).
281 Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, Toward a Theory of "Just Cause" in Employ-
ment Discipline Cases, 1985 DuxE L.J. 594, 606 (1985) (noting that unsatisfactory em-
ployees make the jobs of their co-workers more difficult); see also DERTOUZOS ET AL.,
supra note 3, at I (discussing the impact of the threat of litigation on hiring and firing
decisions and noting that when employers fear terminating inadequate performers,
the morale and performance of otherwise productive employees may suffer).
282 See Mastry, supra note 9, at 1113; Moul, supra note 9, at 1191; Richard C. Reu-
ben, Employment Lawyers Rethink Advice, A.B.A. J., June 1994, at 32.
283 Conceivably, a disciplined employee may decide to seek another job. If she
were asked about reasons for leaving her currentjob, would she be significantly com-
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Ironically, strategy of silence can frustrate its intended effect. Re-
fusals to explain the justifications for discharge may encourage, rather
than discourage, litigation by terminated employees. Employees who
are not given reasons for their discharge are more likely to suspect
that the discharge was unjustified or based on impermissible reasons;
such employees are more likely to bring wrongful termination
actions.2
84
The expanded scope of defamation liability not only encourages
litigation but also negatively impacts day-to-day workplace relation-
ships. The threat of litigation encourages employers to restrict the
flow of information, thus decreasing communication of not only po-
tentially defamatory information but of useful information as well.
Fear of defamation liability also chills employer counseling of employ-
ees with performance or conduct problems. In turn, unexplained ter-
minations undermine morale and create suspicion in the workplace.
Just as disciplined and terminated employees may question the legiti-
macy of unexplained action, their colleagues also become uneasy and
suspicious in the face of unexplained action.285 When employers
adopt silence as a litigation avoidance strategy, declining workplace
morale may be a by-product of recognition of self-publication claims.
pelled to publish the reasons for disciplinary action? While it is not clear that the
doctrine extends this far, a creative argument could be made in this manner.
284 Mouser, supra note 4, at 272-75 (arguing that litigation risks increase when
employers refuse to provide reasons for termination because "termination without
explanation creates an inference of discharge for an impermissible reason" and ex-
plaining how retaliatory discharge, discrimination and even emotional distress claims
may be predicated on an employer's refusal to provide a reason for termination);
Turner, supra note 252, at 27 (arguing that employees "may be more inclined to feel
that their discharge was for an impermissible reason where the employer declines to
reveal any reason for the termination"); see also Eble, supra note 9, at 783-86 (arguing
that the self-publication doctrine legitimizes an employee's silence regarding reasons
for discharge, which in turn increases the burden on discrimination plaintiffs, who
must prove the reason given for discharge was a pretext for unlawful discrimination,
and also increases the factfinding burden for Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission investigators).
285 As one commentator has noted:
When the tort theory allows an employee to recover for an injury occurring
through self-publication, most employers will conclude that the best way to
avoid liability is to withhold the reasons for the termination from the em-
ployee and the prospective employer. This lack of communication will mag-
nify tensions between the employer and its current employees. Employees
will view the employer's acts as arbitrary and unjust since the employer re-
fuses to explain the reason(s) the former employee was terminated.
Mouser, supra note 4, at 287; see also Moul, supra note 9, at 1192 (arguing that unex-
plained terminations leave other employees distracted, disgruntled and uncertain
about what type of behavior may lead to termination).
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4. Inadequacy of Truth Defense and Qualified Privilege
The truth defense 286 and qualified privilege 28 7 limit the number
of compelled self-publication actions in which employers ultimately
face liability. However, these defenses provide inadequate assurance
to most employers, whose strategy is to minimize the possibility of liti-
gation. Defending a claim based on truth or qualified privilege in-
volves litigation, with its financial burden, time consumption, and
intangible costs.
Consider the defense of truth. According to a well-known legal
maxim, "truth is an absolute defense" to a defamation claim. This
maxim's simplicity is deceptive. First, truth is ajury question.2 88 Sec-
ond, establishing whether a statement is true can be a far more com-
plex task than the maxim indicates. For example, in Lewis v. Equitable
Life Assurance Society of the United States,289 the employer argued that
the defamatory statement was true because Equitable indeed fired the
plaintiffs on the grounds of gross insubordination. 290 However, the
court held that what mattered was the truth of the underlying implica-
tion of the statement, not the employer's characterization of the dis-
charge. 291 Because the employer's stated reason for termination
"went beyond accusations and were conclusory statements that plain-
tiffs had engaged in gross insubordination,"292 the court upheld the
jury's determination that the gross insubordination charge was false,
noting that the record provided ample support for the jury's find-
ing.2 93 As Lewis illustrates, the issue of truth raises thorny factual ques-
tions, to be resolved by the jury. A court will uphold the jury's
determination unless the jury's finding "is manifestly and palpably
contrary to the evidence." Thus, employers risk liability if the jury
does not agree with the reason given for termination. 294 While it is
286 See supra discussion at Part II.B.1.
287 See supra discussion at Part II.B.2.
288 See supra text accompanying note 57.
289 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986).
290 Id. at 888.
291 Id at 889.
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 As Reed & Henkel have observed:
It may be quite difficult for employers to prove they should not be liable for
defamation because their statements were true, especially when juries in
what may be essentially wrongful termination cases feel there were insuffi-
cient grounds for discharging the employees. Thus employers correctly fear
defamation suits even when they think what they utter is truthful.
Reed & Henkel, supra note 36, at 317-18 & n.76.
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axiomatic that truth is a complete defense to a defamation claim, in
reality, the defense is an imperfect one.
2 95
Similarly, the qualified privilege provides little comfort for em-
ployers. Like issues of truth, resolution of qualified privilege issues
requires jury consideration.2 96 Qualified privilege can be defeated if
the plaintiff proves that the employer abused the privilege. While the
existence of the privilege is a legal question for the court, abuse is a
factual question for the jury.297 The qualified privilege also has dubi-
ous value as an incentive for employers to provide candid reasons for
termination. Not only does the privilege require litigation of factual
issues, but the legal standards governing abuse of privilege also lack
clarity. The standards are confusing and often inconsistently ap-
plied.2 98 For employers formulating policy and practices, it is far eas-
ier, and much more pragmatic, to adopt a consistent policy of limited
information rather than to guess which instances ultimately will have
the protection of the qualified privilege.
Because juries generally decide issues of truth and abuse of quali-
fied privilege, employers are not likely to prevail on demurrer or sum-
mary judgment.299 Employers also face dim prospects at trial. Since
295 Lewis et al., supra note 2, at 822 ("Because truth is often difficult to prove to
the satisfaction of ajury, especially if the statement concerned a subjective evaluation
of the employee's abilities, it is, in reality, an imperfect defense.").
In addition, the truth defense may have some unexpected side effects for the
employer who is not successful in meeting the burden of proof. As Prosser has noted,
"[t]he defense of truth frequently is a hazardous venture for the defendant, since if
he fails to sustain it the jury may be permitted to find that he has reiterated the
defamation, and to consider the fact in aggravation of the damages." KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 20, § 116, at 842. Fortunately for most employers, the modern trend limits
aggravation to cases where the defense was raised in bad faith. However, an employer
could be at risk for the aggravation penalty if the employer's case is particularly un-
sympathetic. See id.
296 William L. Kandel, Workplace Dishonesty and Security: Precautions About Prevention,
6 EMPLOYEE REL. LJ. 79, 86-87 (1990) (observing that the qualified privilege provides
'no relief' for employers because the "privilege still leaves the door open for judges
and juries to decide whether the statements were truthful and lacking 'malice"').
297 E.g., Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d
876, 890 (Minn. 1986); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 619 (1977); see also Reed
& Henkel, supra note 36, at 311-12 & n.42.
298 Reed & Henkel, supra note 36, at 318-20 (arguing that the standards for malice
sufficient to defeat the qualified privilege are vague and confusing and explained with
ambiguous jury instructions that juries disregard); Daniloff, supra note 7, at 708-11
(critiquing qualified privilege standards as vague, confusing and unevenly applied);
Posey, supra note 58, at 483-91 (1989) (referring to qualified privilege as "the con-
fused privilege" and analyzing the myriad standards of qualified privilege).
299 Eble, supra note 9, at 770-71 (1995); Kandel, supra note 296, at 86-87.
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"most jurors are employees, not management,"300 juries tend to sym-
pathize with plaintiffs. 30 1 As one observer has noted, "[t]ruth is in the
eye of the beholder, and some beholders on a jury panel bring with
them deeply ingrained prejudices about employers and employ-
ees."30 2 Thus, if truth and qualified privilege are the employer's safe
harbor in the storm of defamation, defendant employers may find
conditions to be chilled, foggy, and not as safe as promised. The em-
ployer who must litigate to prove the truth of the reason for discharge
must hope the jury agrees with the employer's view of the discharge.
The employer who asserts a qualified privilege can expect the plaintiff
to argue that the employer abused the privilege, and this issue also
takes the case to the jury. As cases reach juries, the likelihood of a
plaintiff's verdict increases.303 While employers ultimately may prevail
on appeal, litigation through appeal is a costly and draining process
which employers generally prefer to avoid. In addition, courts are
hesitant to reverse a jury's factual determination regarding truth or
loss of the qualified privilege.30 4 Consequently, employers can expect
to incur substantial defense costs as self-publication cases proceed
through discovery, trial and, if necessary, appeal.
After expensive and exhausting appeals, employers ultimately win
the great majority of defamation cases. Still, the fear of litigation
which leads employers to turn off the spigot of employee-related
information is a reasonable response from the employer's view-
300 Gary S. Anderson, Commentary, Avoidable Error, THE RECORDER, June 15, 1995,
at 8, 9 (discussing the importance of careful jury selection in employment cases).
301 Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 400 n.36 (Cal. 1988) ("'Jurors
can easily identify with the worker who has received a pink slip."') (quoting William
Gould, Stemming the Wrongful Discharge Tide, 13 EMPLOYEE REL. LJ. 404, 406-07 (1987/
88)); Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at W44 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 970
(1984) (observing thatjury sympathy for plaintiffs "may result in a very large number
of erroneous verdicts for employees"); Daniloff, supra note 7, at 690 n.13 (stating that
juries are biased in favor of defamation plaintiffs). Employers take a pragmatic, re-
signed view of jury sympathy. As one attorney lamented, "To a jury, 'even if you're
ight, you're still bigger than the guy who's suing you."' Jeff B. Copeland et al., Re-
venge of the Fired, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 16, 1987, at 46, 47.
302 Anderson, supra note 302, at 8.
303 As Professor Langvardt has observed:
Far more often than not in defamation cases, the plaintiff wins in front of
the jury. Some estimates are that plaintiffs receive favorable verdicts from
juries in better than than three-fourths of the defamation suits that go to
trial.... there is no denying that, statistically, plaintiffs tend to have a very
favorable shot at winning a defamation case when it is tried to a jury.
Langvardt, supra note 3, at 74, 75.
304 See, e.g., Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389
N.W.2d 876, 888-90 (1986).
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point. Litigation itself is an inefficient, costly, time-consuming pro-
cess. Even when defamation defendants win, they lose, given the
resource commitments required by even successful litigation.305
For employers concerned about defamation claims, the best solu-
don is to avoid litigation entirely. Employers frame personnel policies
and heed advice so as to decrease the threat of litigation, and not
merely to avoid liability. The overwhelming advice has been to give
minimal information to avoid the threat of defamation claims. With
the cost of defending claims, the likelihood thatjurors will determine
critical defense issues, and the murky legal standards for proof of
truth and loss of qualified privilege, it is not surprising that many em-
ployers are adopting silence as their strategy. Simply stated, an em-
ployer's best defense against liability is to stay out of the courtroom,
where juries' sympathy for plaintiffs may place employers at a distinct
disadvantage.
C. A Need for Balance
The debate over the doctrine of compelled self-publication in-
vokes important competing considerations. To be effective in the
workplace, defamation law must balance the interest of protecting em-
ployees' reputation against the interest of employers and society in
facilitating workplace communication.
Compelled self-publication provides a remedy needed in some
circumstances. As one commentator has noted, "It]he trend toward
adoption of some version of the self-publication doctrine reflects a
growing sensitivity to the need to balance an employer's unfettered
authority to discharge with the perilous position of a falsely accused
employee."30 6 However, the remedy sweeps too broadly. Based on a
standard met in virtually every termination, existing formulations of
compelled self-publication deter communication of useful informa-
tion as well as harmful defamatory communication. Under existing
doctrine, every termination based on performance or misconduct po-
tentially gives rise to a claim when the terminated employee inevitably
seeks new employment. Considered in isolation, such problems pro-
vide compelling arguments for eliminating self-publication claims in
the workplace. On the other hand, outright rejection of the doctrine
may leave deserving plaintiffs without a remedy. In light of these
problems, defamation law should adopt a new approach to more ef-
fectively balance the competing interests of reputation, remedy and
information flow in the workplace.
305 Reed & Henkel, supra note 36, at 318.
306 Shearer, supra note 9, at 57, 64.
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One problem with the prevailing views of competing concerns is
the emphasis placed on conflicting interests of employers and employ-
ees. The free flow of workplace information is notjust a problem for
the workplace, but one for larger society as well. Social policy favors
candid workplace communication:
[T]he flow of personnel information, like information communi-
cated to the media, is vital. Employers must regularly evaluate,
counsel and discipline their employees; report that information to
others inside and outside the organization; and take appropriate
action regarding that information. Both businesses and society suf-
fer if unqualified or undesirable employees are hired or pro-
moted. . . . Unfettered communication is necessary to the
workplace and is in the public's interest.
30 7
Broad defamation liability interferes with achievement of this so-
cietal goal. While commentators and courts sometimes recognize the
societal interests at stake, the prevailing analytical approaches pit em-
ployers against employees who are terminated. Such approaches are
too simplistic. A better view would recognize and accommodate the
competing interests of (a) employers, (b) employees with perform-
ance or misconduct problems, (c) co-workers, (d) prospective co-
workers, and (e) the public.
IV. A PROPOSED NEW DOCTRINE: REFASHIONING THE REQUIREMENTS
OF COMPELLED SELF-PUBLICATION
Workplace defamation law should strive to balance the compet-
ing goals of protecting the reputations of employees and encouraging
free discussion of negative personnel information that is useful to
business and society.308 In the case of self-publication defamation,
courts should act with particular sensitivity to this sometimes uneasy
balance.
Accordingly, courts should limit the generalized application of
the compelled self-publication claim while preserving the cause of ac-
tion in cases that meet criteria from "hard cases." The case in which
an employee merely alleges that she had to repeat a false, defamatory
reason for termination to a prospective employer should not present a
cognizable defamation claim. Instead, the cause of action should be
premised on a showing that the employee's defamation claim is not
based on a garden-variety termination and subsequent job search. In
307 Lewis et al., supra note 2, at 800-01; see also Layne v. Builders Plumbing Supply
Co., 569 N.E.2d 1104, 1111 (Il. App. Ct. 1991) (recognizing that open communica-
tion in the workplace serves the interests of employers, employees and the public).
308 Lewis et al., supra note 2, at 801; see also Posey, supra note 58, at 493.
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line with the historical roots of the doctiine, courts should limit com-
pelled self-publication claims to cases in which the employee has evi-
dence of egregious conduct by the employer. Additionally, the
actionable claim should require the plaintiff to demonstrate that a
prospective employer asked about the reasons for termination, and
that the plaintiff made a reasonable effort to explain the circum-
stances of termination. Where the plaintiff demonstrates that a pro-
spective employer inquired about the reason for termination and that
the plaintiff attempted to explain in response, the plaintiff has estab-
lished a truly compelled disclosure, and she has taken steps to miti-
gate damages. Such prerequisites would narrow the reach of the
compelled self-publication doctrine, while providing a cause of action
where one is most needed. Properly circumscribed, the doctrine
would apply only to cases of egregious conduct, and the chilling effect
on routine workplace communications would be minimized
substantially.
By placing tighter requirements on the plaintiff's prima facie case
and encouraging plaintiffs to mitigate damages, the proposed new
doctrine of compelled self-publication defamation focuses on "hard
cases." The refashioned standards require a plaintiff to meet three
prerequisites in order to maintain a defamation cause of action based
on compelled self-publication. A plaintiff would have to establish (1)
egregious employer conduct (as described below); (2) an inquiry by a
prospective employer regarding the reasons for termination; and (3)
effort by the plaintiff to mitigate damages by explaining the circum-
stances of the termination.30 9 To establish the requisite egregious em-
ployer conduct, the plaintiff would plead and prove not only that the
employer defamed the plaintiff, but also that the employer acted im-
properly in doing so. A plaintiff would bring her case within the
"hard case" framework by establishing either or both of the following:
(1) the employer's characterization of plaintiffs termination was un-
fair, unreasonable or misleading under the circumstances, or (2) the
employer was motivated by ill will or the purpose to injure the plaintiff
without just cause.3 10 The alternative tests encompass types of em-
ployer conduct found in the workplace self-publication doctrine's
leading cases.
309 The traditional common law elements of the defamation cause of action would
remain unchanged.
310 See Stuempges v. Parke Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Minn. 1980) (citing
McKenzie v. William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 183 N.W. 516, 517 (Minn.
1921)).
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The first test, which premises the actionable claim on the em-
ployer's characterization of the termination, flows directly from form-
ative self-publication cases. Colonial Stores v. Barrett,311 Lewis v.
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States,312 Churchey v. Adolph
Coors Co.,3a 3 and First State Bank of Corpus Christi v. Ake314 share the
common themes of questionable characterization of the terminated
employee's conduct and a misunderstanding at least partially attribu-
table to errors by supervisors or management that led to the employee
being terminated for a defamatory reason. In each of those cases, the
employer characterized the discharge in a defamatory manner unwar-
ranted by the circumstances. 315 Not surprisingly, prospective employ-
ers refused to hire the employees who explained that they had been
discharged for dishonesty, gross insubordination, or improper con-
duct toward fellow employees, and "fabrication [was] an unacceptable
alternative" 316 to truthful disclosure. However, unlike a case where
the employer's characterization is justified, the employer's defamatory
statement, even though made only to the plaintiff, unfairly prejudices
the plaintiff when she seeks a new job and is asked to explain the
termination-thereby republishing the original employer's unfair and
unjustified defamatory statements.
In addition, courts should permit self-publication defamation
claims where the employer, acting with ill will or intent to injure the
employee, gives the employee an unjustifiable defamatory explanation
for termination. As the court noted in Stuempges v. Parke, Davis &
311 38 S.E.2d 306 (Ga. Ct. App. 1946); see supra text accompanying notes 77-98.
312 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986); see supra text accompanying notes 111-36.
313 759 P.2d 1336 (Colo. 1988); see supra text accompanying notes137-55.
314 606 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); see supra text accompanying notes 157-
69.
315 See Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336 (Colo. 1988) (plaintiff fired
for "dishonesty"; court noted that evidence was susceptible of other reasonable inter-
pretations); Colonial Stores v. Barrett, 38 S.E.2d 306, 308 (Ga. Ct. App. 1946) (plain-
tiff who tried to stop a fight between co-workers and struck the aggressor in self-
defense was discharged for "improper conduct toward fellow employees"); Lewis v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986)
(plaintiffs, who at first received no instructions and subsequently received a series of
inconsistent instructions for filing expense reports, repeatedly revised their reports in
response to supervisors' demands; after refusing to revise the reports for a third time
pursuant to yet another set of instructions, plaintiffs were fired for "gross insubordina-
tion" and denied severance pay); First State Bank of Corpus Christi v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d
696 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (fidelity bond stating that bank had suffered a loss caused
by plaintiffs "dishonesty"; however employer conceded at trial that plaintiff had not
been dishonest).
316 Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 888.
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Co.,3 '7 "it is also important to protect the job seeker from malicious
undercutting by a former employer."3 1 8 Such conduct fits easily into
the "hard case" standard, given the relative imbalance of power be-
tween employers and employees. Although Stuempges involved a de-
famatory reference given by a former employer, the case is instructive
and useful in the context of self-publication. Similar considerations of
protecting employees come into play for defamatory statements that a
job seeker must repeat in response to a prospective employer's in-
quiry. The employer should not be able to accomplish indirectly--
defaming the employee in a private conversation that foreseeably
must be repeated-what it cannot accomplish directly. Moreover, like
the mischaracterization standard, the employer motivation standard
also derives from formative cases. For example, applying this standard
to Lewis, plaintiffs would have had credible allegations of ill will or
purpose to injure based on the company's employing the "gross insub-
ordination" characterization as grounds for depriving plaintiffs of sev-
erance pay. Similarly, in Ake, the employer's willingness to insist that
Ake's "dishonesty" had caused a loss, while believing that Ake had not
engaged in dishonest transactions, could have raised a factual issue
regarding whether the employer's ill will may have motivated the de-
famatory explanation for Ake's termination.
Thus, a plaintiff who can establish the requisite showing of egre-
gious conduct in addition to foreseeable compulsion would be enti-
tled to bring a self-publication claim. For example, a plaintiff could
allege the employer has mischaracterized the circumstances, or the
underlying facts do not support the employer's representation of
events, or the employer acted out of improper motives or ill will.
Even with such a showing, however, there are further checks on
the cause of action. In line with the emerging standard,3 19 the plain-
tiff would have to establish that a prospective employer indeed asked
plaintiff about the reasons for termination. In addition, courts would
focus on plaintiffs efforts to explain the circumstances of the termina-
tion, to assure that plaintiff attempted to mitigate damages. Courts or
legislatures could adopt the proposed framework. In contrast to ex-
isting legislation, the egregious-employer-conduct-plus-inquiry stan-
dard does not depend on complex, technical notification
317 297 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1980).
318 Id. at 258.
319 SeeAlstad v. Office Depot, No. C-94-1400 DLG, 1995 WL 84452 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
7, 1995); Batch v. Russ Berrie & Co., No. C93-20166 RMW (PVT), 1994 WL 634052
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 1994); Davis v. Consolidated Freightways, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438 (Ct.
App. 1994).
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requirements 320 to narrow the cause of action, nor does the standard
eliminate the cause of action.
321
This combined showing of egregious conduct, inquiry by a pro-
spective employer, and efforts to mitigate damages distinguish the cir-
cumstances giving rise to a self-publication claim from the average
termination. Restricting the cause of action to cases where the plain-
tiff can demonstrate that the former employer unjustifiably mis-
characterized the discharge or acted out of ill will provides reasonable
limitations on the cause of action.322 Instead of being potentially
available to every plaintiff who is terminated and given a defamatory
reason, self-publication would be actionable only for those plaintiffs
who could allege and ultimately prove facts indicating the employer
had acted egregiously. Thus, employees discharged under ordinary
circumstances could not base a defamation claim on self-publication.
However, self-publication defamation accompanied by abusive em-
ployer conduct would be actionable.
The egregious-employer-conduct-plus-inquiry standard benefits
workplace and societal interests. The standard serves the interests of
employers and employees alike by easing the flow of information in
the workplace. By maintaining the compelled self-publication claim
for defamation claims based on egregious employer conduct, the stan-
dard encourages managers to justify and document allegations of mis-
conduct or poor performance. Similarly, the standard deters
managers from making unfounded allegations of misconduct or poor
performance.
On the other hand, without concern that every conference repre-
sents a potential defamation action, employers will be freer to provide
feedback to problem employees. Candid feedback about misconduct
or the need for improved performance benefits employees who have
problems in the workplace, as well as providing information that em-
ployees can use to increase skills and opportunities for advancement.
In addition, co-workers benefit from increased information flow as the
320 Cf MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.933 (West 1993).
321 Cf COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-125.5 (West 1995).
322 Moreover, the conduct-plus-inquiry standard does not place an onerous bur-
den on plaintiffs. In most cases, the evidence needed to establish the prima facie case
would be needed to defeat any claim of qualified privilege. However, the conduct-
plus-inquiry standard will permit cases to be resolved at an earlier stage of proceed-
ings. Similarly, plaintiff would need mitigation evidence to meet an employer's de-
fense of failure to mitigate damages. The United States Supreme Court applied a
similar rationale in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 778 (1986)
(placing burden upon plaintiffs to prove falsity of defamatory statement viewed as
only marginal increase in burden where plaintiffs already required to show fault).
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performance of their colleagues improve. Hidden litigation risks,
such as increased suspicion generated when no information is com-
municated, also should decrease. In sum, narrowing the reach of self-
publication defamation will result in freer workplace communication
and will promote morale and productive workplace relationships.
The proposed standard accommodates societal interests as well as
the interests of employers and employees. Cases may be resolved
more efficiently. Where a plaintiff has credible evidence of egregious
employer conduct, settlement will be encouraged. In the absence of
such evidence, claims should be resolved short of trial. Finally, by
making the cause of action available where employers have used defa-
mation to terminate an employee in an abusive or misleading man-
ner, the proposed standard serves the societal interests of deterring
abuses of employer prerogatives and providing recourse to employees
harmed by egregious employer conduct.
V. CONCLUSION
The competing concerns raised by self-publication claims are not
easily accommodated. Recognition in its current form-providing a
cause of action based on foreseeability and compulsion, circum-
scribed only by applicability of qualified privilege or the defense of
truth-has created a tort that sweeps too broadly. Despite efforts to
limit the tort's impact on the workplace, recognition of self-publica-
tion defamation chills workplace communication. However, outright
rejection of the tort also sweeps too broadly.3 23 Where employer con-
323 In some cases, courts have rejected the doctrine with little, if any, analysis.
Their opinions give virtually no consideration to the doctrine's merits and weaknesses
or the balance of interests underlying rejection or acceptance of compelled self-publi-
cation defamation claims. The typical opinion rejecting the doctrine does so almost
summarily. As Professor Langvardt has observed:
Seldom have courts that have disapproved the self-publication doctrine even
acknowledged the existence of authority to the contrary. Instead, those
courts have seemed content to consider all such communications voluntary,
and hence not actionable, no matter what the circumstances were. Regard-
less of how the self-publication question should be answered, courts'
mechanical rejections of the self-publication doctrine are not particularly
useful because they provide essentially no insight concerning the strengths
and weaknesses or advantages and disadvantages of the doctrine.
Langvardt, supra note 3, at 267-68.
For examples of cases taking such a summary approach, see Gore v. Health-Tex,
Inc., 567 So. 2d 1307, 1308-09 (Ala. 1990) (simply stating "[w]e are not prepared to
hold that a plaintiff's own repetition of allegedly defamatory statements can supply
the element of publication essential in a slander action"); Sigmon v. Womack, 279
S.E.2d 254, 257 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (providing defamatory reason for termination on
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duct is abusive or egregious, especially where courts have not adopted
other common law remedies for wrongful discharge, the defamation
cause of action based on self-publication is both useful and needed.
Neither rejection of the doctrine nor acceptance of its current
formulation is appropriate to adequately address the interests of em-
ployers, all employees, and society. Instead, the law should be re-
shaped to provide court access in cases of abuse while more easily
disposing of self-publication claims based merely on the plaintiffs re-
publication of the former employer's defamatory statements in ajob
interview.
This Article proposes an accommodation of the competing con-
cerns by restructuring the elements of the cause of action. As previ-
ously discussed, the historical basis for recognition of compelled self-
publication has been egregious employer conduct. The restructured
claim would require plaintiffs, as part of the prima facie case, to plead
and prove (1) egregious employer conduct; (2) an inquiry by a pro-
spective employer; and (3) efforts by the plaintiff to mitigate damages
by explaining the circumstances of the termination. Further, the con-
duct-plus-inquiry standard restricts the cause of action to plaintiffs
who are truly compelled to disclose the reasons for termination and
who demonstrate such compulsion by showing that a prospective em-
ployer asked for an explanation of termination. This refashioned
claim would tend to preclude claims based on normal workplace in-
teraction, encourage settlement in cases with credible allegations of
egregious employer conduct, and provide a basis for disposing of
claims on the pleadings or summary judgment phase where the de-
faming employer has not engaged in egregious conduct.
employment application constituted a voluntary publication); Green v. Sun Trust
Banks, Inc., 399 S.E.2d 712, 717 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (voluntary self-publication);
Wieder v. Chemical Bank, 608 N.Y.S.2d 195, 196 (App. Div. 1994) (rejection of com-
pelled self-publication claim based on analogy to a case of voluntary self-publication),
appeal denied, 639 N.E.2d 417 (N.Y. 1994).
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